|
I
was drawn to Sam Harris'
book How Science Can
Determine Human Values:
The Moral Landscape,
Free Press, 2011 to see what
one of the evangelical
atheists would have to say
about morality.
The basic thesis in
his introduction became
clearest in a review quoted
in Harris' afterword: “...Harris has
identified a real problem
rooted in the idea that facts
are objective and values are
subjective. Harris rejects
this ... by pointing to
evaluative truths so obvious
that they need no defense. For
example, a world in which
everyone was maximally
miserable would be worse than
a world in which everyone was
happy, and it would be wrong
to try to move us towards the
first world and away from the
second.”
While there are some
useful insights, the book was
not the exciting challenge I had
expected. In fact only when I
realized that his thinking
reinforced the usefulness of the
international human rights
project did I appreciate his
book. More on this below! In his first
chapter, Moral Truth, Harris
argues against cultural
relativism and toleration. There
can be a right and a wrong moral
answer about what will advance
human well-being. Science can
help establish a moral truth. I
didn't find this earth
shattering.
Defining good in terms of
well-being of the global human
family brought to mind the US
constitution's “pursuit of
happiness.” I take it as given
that scientific study can add
insights on any matter of human
concern. I too reject an
absolute cultural relativism
about what is right and wrong –
on a different rational basis.
And the human rights project
rejects this too. The chapter on good
and evil adds lots of insights
which don’t feel crucial to the
main thesis. Human cooperation
is an important part of the
science of human well-being -
the study of the brain and of
human cooperation and
selfishness are parts of that.
Genetic changes may have
led to social emotions, moral
intuitions and language; leading
to cooperative behaviour;
leading to cultural norms, laws
and social institutions. Harris
shows human groups can be wrong
about how to maximize personal
and social well-being.
Good and evil and moral
concerns translate into facts
about how human behaviour
affects the collective
well-being of the species and
these facts are amenable to
scientific study. Good and evil
increase or decrease human
well-being. Religious morality
can also be defined as obedience
to God - a matter disconnected
from human well-being. Here I
note that those in a religious
tradition can equally be
searching for ways which enhance
human well-being in the here and
now. However, Harris is right
that believers can also choose
to draw on ancient articles of a
faith tradition to assert the
immorality of contraception,
masturbation and homosexuality
without regard for the human
suffering which results. So I
find Harris' approach here
helpful. Like Harris I think
that the pious uncoupling of
moral concern from the reality
of human suffering can cause
tremendous harm. Harris discusses
concerns about moral realism and
whether we can ever know if
we're right or wrong – basically
by pointing out that similar
arguments could be made, but are
not, about other scientific
areas like mathematics. Is
Einstein's truth that the
passage of time varies with
velocity any less true because
it lacks a large degree of human
consensus? There is likely a
bigger consensus that cruelty is
wrong. Full consensus is not the
normal situation in most areas
of science. People can be wrong.
The
final
sections of the chapter
explore the difficulties of
assessing human suffering and
well-being, drawing on social
studies of our behaviour and
on studies of the functioning
of our brains. We can be more
concerned about one suffering
person than reports of a
colossal human catastrophe
from an earthquake. We tend to
give priority concern to our
own family members.
We tend to consider a
loss as more serious than
failing to realize the same
thing as a gain. But then, as
Harris notes, this is
precisely where the science
about ourselves can help and
we can create laws and
institutions to deal with
ourselves. The Chapter ends
pointing out the natural
origin of human evil with
connection to brain function.
Similarly, the “myth of free
will” is best replaced with
the knowledge that our
behaviour stems from
biological events of which we
are not conscious. The chapter on
belief begins with the recent
arrival of language, the
transformative power of words
and our ability to accept as
true a proposition in words –
belief.
Research on brain
activity finds that belief is
associated with greater activity
in the part of the brain linking
knowledge to emotional
associations. It seems we like
truth more than falsehood. Then
there are a lot of systematic
errors our minds can be shown to
make – giving bias. Belief
systems such as conservatism
satisfy psychological needs. And
certain types of reasoning are
hooked to emotion. Yet Harris
gives grounds for hoping that
science and reasoning can over
time shift “beliefs.” According to Harris
and those he cites, although
religion is more than belief, it
starts with a set of beliefs.
And he suggests that belief is
largely what people teach their
children. Early studies of brain
response and belief stimuli
suggest no distinction between
religious and other belief
propositions.
While no expert, I wonder
if religion might not better be
thought of as a cultural
tradition one grows up in,
rather than as a set of
propositions one “believes.” My
Jewish work collaborator saw
things that way. She was a Jew
and belief propositions had
little to do with it.
Similarly, I see myself
in the protestant Christian
tradition, whatever my current
“belief” about this or that
proposition. And I grope for
insights that will allow me to
contribute to improving the
human lot. On
the other hand, as Harris points
out in his discussion of
Jihadists, religious beliefs can
have consequences.
Harris gets upset about
scientists who profess religious
beliefs. I understand. He wants
reason to be absolute. He cannot
understand how a scientist like
Collins, Director of NIH, could
accept a divinity of Jesus.
Harris doesn’t seem to get it. I
admire the brilliant political
move of appointing this man.
While safe on what matters – his
concern to better the lot of
human kind – this man’s
appointment undercuts the
religious right of the US by
professing his Christian faith.
It probably matters more to have
someone who will get the right
things done, rather than have
someone who will apply a
ruthless scientific logic when
publishing articles on the
Christian Faith which are
largely irrelevant to the man’s
public usefulness. The final short
chapter ends with hope, despite
difficulties of measuring
well-being and the difficulty of
separating my well-being from
the needs of global human
well-being.
There is an afterword
which responds to some critics. While largely
agreeing with Harris, I did not
feel an urgency and importance
about his thoughts. For me,
something was missing. Harris
appears to be aware that
science, in and of itself, does
not solve anything. For me, it
is the messy human political
process which muddles through
things - drawing on science if
we’re lucky.
Beyond science, the idea
of courts and justice can
contribute sometimes to that
political messy process. Here,
the book might have noted the
role of international human
rights in defining what is
desirable and how to adjudicate
amongst competing self-
interests – mine and the common
good. In the mid 2oth
century, the nations of the
world, acting for the peoples of
the world, established a code of
human rights (the Universal
Declaration). The enjoyment of
these rights is to be maximized
– which is the equivalent of the
pursuit of human happiness in a
series of more specific areas.
So improving human welfare has
been sort-of defined: one
maximises the enjoyment of the
enumerated human rights. The
nations of the world also
provided a means of adjudicating
the enjoyment of the rights in
specific situations - and across
national boundaries.
There are treaties like
the UN Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights which contain
within them an international
body – the Human Rights
Committee. There can be advice
and there can be adjudication of
individual case situations –
like Ahani
v Canada 2002. This
was not and is not a fully
rational process. It is a
somewhat political and imperfect
human process. But it does draw
on evidence such as science.
More than this, it is a due
process spanning the human
species which draws strength
from that human sense of
fairness of which Harris, at one
point, speaks.
It is secular, but it
implicitly included thoughts
from the religious faith
traditions from the nations
included in its establishment. So when I accept, with
Harris, that female genital
mutilation is evil I can add that
international due process has
determined it to be in conflict
with the adopted human rights
code. So Harris might take hope.
There is a means in place to
realise his notion of using
science to move humankind in the
direction of its greater welfare –
defined as maximizing individual
human rights enjoyment - albeit
slowly and indirectly.  |