The
Fog of Peace: A
Memoir of International Peacekeeping in the 21st
Century, by
Jean-Marie
Guéhenno (Washington
DC,
Brookings Institute Press, 2015) draws its title
from that of the book and
movie The
Fog of War written about
Robert McNamara and the turbulent lessons of the
Vietnam War. Guéhenno, too,
is writing about
turbulence:
controversial times, new
kinds of war, and lessons for UN Peacekeeping.
He served as UN Under Secretary
General and as head of UN peacekeeping for 8
years - 2000 to 2008.
Important
thoughts
emerge from the book: without an agreement of
some sort between the
parties at war or at odds, a workable mandate
cannot be defined and
peacekeeping is impossible; peacekeeping needs
ongoing active political
endeavours to build the peace; for effective
peacekeeping, the task must be
clear and the size and resources of the
peacekeeping mission must be up to the
task given; peacekeeping requires dealing with
some distasteful players; there
has been evolution in international law about
military intervention and changes
in the role of the UN.
Prologue. A
Prologue gives Guéhenno’s background. He
had been head of France’s
Foreign Ministry’s policy planning staff. At the
time of his UN appointment he
was a senior sitting judge in the French “Cour
des Comptes,” chairing a French
defense institute, teaching and writing. His aim
ends his prologue. He says
that peacekeeping can only be successful if it
is considered as a moral
enterprise. It is not a fight against evil. “…
it has to consider conflicting
goods and lesser evils and make choices. It is
those dilemmas that I would like
to share with the reader.” And he
does
that.
Chapters.
Each
chapter of the book considers the UN
politics around a theme: Afghanistan;
Iraq;
Georgia, the War that Could Have Been Avoided;
Cote D’Ivoire; Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC); DRC; Sudan; Lebanon;
Kosovo; Haiti; Syria - with
theme A
World out of Control. Each
chapter closes with concluding thoughts and Guéhenno’s learning. The
chapters are fascinating in
content but hard reading. Each is a journey into
the intricacies of the
politics of a world region with complex
political situations and a range of
unfamiliar actors.
Afghanistan
9/11
and the War on Terror. A shift in
international law began with Security
Council resolution 1368. Previously one country
could only attack another
without Security Council approval if in
self-defence. Now that could be done to
combat terrorism. The US forced Bin Laden out –
but what then about the future
of Afghanistan? An
“almost
miraculous” outcome from the UN conference in
Bonn left the door open to a
process under UN supervision allowing
Afghanistan to evolve towards legitimacy
of government with an interim government. Much
initial UN energy went on
humanitarian aid and then it moved to
reconstruction. International NGOs rushed
in, bypassing the government and thus
perpetuating its weakness. By 2007,
international disarray was more apparent. A US
revenge mission had been made
into a bold international effort at nation
building. Unfortunately, it left
behind a struggling government, an ascendant
Taliban and suicide bombers.
Iraq
–
Lingering Damage to the Idea of Collective
Action. The Iraq chapter opens
with George Bush challenging the
UN around Iraq’s nuclear facilities and the then
sixteen Security Council
resolutions not complied with. The Security
Council was not ready to vote on
any joint action. In March, the U.S. and a small
group of like-minded countries
met in the Azores and issued a declaration with
“war aims” in Iraq but left the
door open to UN action.
The
UN
began exploring a role in post-war Iraq. Then
came the game-changing August
2003 bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad.
The occupation formally ended
July 2004 and the UN played a role in Iraq
elections. The Security Council
should not pretend that it can address a serious
crisis when a major power has
a big strategic interest. It can play a very
useful role in a crisis of lesser
order.
Georgia
–
the war that could have been avoided.
Georgia
began as a
“frozen conflict,” a UN observer mission
together with CIS (Russian)
peacekeepers brokering the conflict lines
between Georgia and the former Soviet
era autonomous region of Abkhazia adjacent to
Russia. Abkhazia had sought
independence at the end of the Cold War.
A
peaceful revolution in Georgia at the end of
2003 led to a window for peace by
2005. The UN and Europe underestimated the
chance of war. Georgia began
hostilities in Summer 2008 that ended quickly
with Russia recognizing Abkhazia
as a nation and the formal partition of Georgia.
There was the unfortunate
precedent of Kosovo, separated from Serbia.
Sierra
Leone
– elections are rarely the shortest route to
peace. Sierra Leone is part of
former French West Africa. It
is economically viable and source of 50% of the
world’s cocoa. It has a
political divide between Northern Muslim tribes
and Christian Southern tribes.
In 2000, following a military coup, an election
that blocked a Northern
candidate and was intended to elect the military
ruler. Southerner Gbagbo,
outsider to traditional politics, was elected.
When
conflict
with the North began, first France then the UN
pulled the parties
together and put in peacekeepers. The basic flaw
was to push for an election to
resolve fundamental differences. President
Mbecki of South Africa began a
mediator role for the African Union. There were
efforts to push for the
election in 2006, but manoeuvrings continued
until 2010. Gbagbo lost, did not
resign, but was crushed by French and UN forces.
Encouraging solutions in which
all major actors had a stake might have saved
much energy.
Democratic
Republic
of Congo – the Limits of the Use of Force. Vast, forested,
resource rich but infrastructure- and
government-deprived, the DRC received the
fleeing Hutu militias and refugees
following the 1995 massacre in Rwanda. The
initial fear was of large-scale
killing – a fear that remains a possibility.
It
took
time to get 6 African nations and 3 rebel
movements to agree on a cease-fire
and a peace plan in Lusaka July 1999. In
November, the Security Council created
UN
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUC, to
monitor the cease-fire and
oversee the removal of foreign armies. There
were big problems. The DRC is
huge, there were many different armed forces and
five thousand UN soldiers were
in a vast country. Joint UN and South African
initiatives led to DRC efforts to
deal with the militia and led to a Rwandan troop
withdrawal late 2002.
The
gold-rich
Ituri area, occupied by Ugandan troops, posed a
threat of deadly
violence. The military inadequacy of the UN for
more than observing in Bunia,
capital of Ituri, was clear. A larger UN force
was assembled. March 2004, peace
was unravelling in Bukavu, capital of Southern
Kivu. Several hundred people
were killed. MONUC lost credibility. Strong leadership and 6,000 more troops were
added. March 2005 UN troops
were ambushed, but the UN counter attacked and
issued an ultimatum for militias
of Ituri to disarm. Eventually 15,000 did. MONUC
was short of capacity for
protection overseeing elections, but with help
from EU troops, largely around
Kinshasa, elections were held. A final UN
mandate was to help the Congolese
army - with mixed results.
A
military presence is never enough. Robust
peacekeeping is doomed without a
robust political posture. The UN cannot enforce
peace. But the UN has “the
capacity to create trust in its fairness and
impartiality.”
DRC
– Was
it Worth it? A
wider regional peace process
in which DRC’s neighbours allow the DRC to
become stronger is needed as well as
the internal Inter-Congolese Dialogue process.
The UN’s Niasse and South
Africa’s Mbeki pulled off a transitional
agreement in Pretoria 2002 and refined
power-sharing in 2003. A constitution was
ratified by referendum in 2005 and
elections were held in 2006 and won by Kabila.
The fragile relationship between
Rwanda and DRC has been constructive in moments
of one or the other’s weakness
and of external pressure.
The
DRC
peacekeeping mission was the UN’s most costly.
Internationals have limited
ability to pressure leaders or to allow
expressions from the people. The UN
uses referenda and elections and the DRC was the
biggest ever. Weak
institutions remain a concern. By 2009 there was
still no effective justice
system in DRC. Yet lives were saved in Ituri.
Only its people can transform the
Congo. Peacekeepers can help contain the most
extreme violence. They can only
open a fragile path towards a more open society.
Sudan
–
Dangers of a Fragmented Strategy for a
Divided Country. The world slowly
became aware of genocide by
Janjaweed groups in Dafur in 2004, the year the
African Union and its Security
Council became operational. The UN Security
Council agreed to a small mission
once peace had been agreed. An opportunity arose
because agreement was being
reached in South Sudan. The Nairobi meeting of
the Security Council missed the
opportunity for a wider Sudanese peace process.
January
2005,
an agreement allowed for the self-determination
of South Sudan, despite
the fact that the North was a functioning State
and the South was starting from
scratch. The South was to get 50% of oil
revenues generated in the South. The
role of the UN was not spelled out. During 2005,
10,000 UN troops were
authorized for the South and African Union
troops for the North.
Visits
to
Dafur and the South gave insights. Presented
with evidence of a village
destroyed by Janjeweed, the local government in
Dafur showed no interest in
reconciliation and questioned the AU troop
level. The South was primitive and
with mined roads that made it difficult to
attract peacekeepers. The capital
Rumbek had no paved roads or electricity. The
South wanted more UN troops, but
the South has to develop its own force for
counter insurgency.
Darfur
-
Deploying Peacekeepers against all Odds. The international
focus
was Dafur and the UN focus was on how to support
the AU. A shift from AU to UN
seemed inevitable in the long term, but that
never quite happened.
Planning
for
a UN force began late 2005. Western talk of
“responsibility to protect”
fuelled a pro-Islam shift in Sudan. Two years
passed. To get approval for a UN
planning team was not possible until the AU had
an agreement between Sudan and
Dafur rebels. That peace agreement was not good.
Then the planning found that
Dafur and the rebels had changed. They shared
anti-Western anti-UN sentiments
with Khartoum. They confused the UN with the
West. Expectations were wrong.
Conflict destroys traditional structures faster
than they can be replaced.
In
the
end the UN had to accept a “hybrid mission” with
the AU. Details were not
good. Kartoum’s little interest in the peace
process showed when it accepted
inadequate AU troop levels. After a decade of
international engagement with
Sudan, the results are at best mixed.
The displaced villagers of Dafur will
remain in camps that will become
cities. They may be hotbeds of despair and
violence or they may evolve.
Lebanon
-
How to End a War. July
2006 Hezbollah fired rockets against
Israeli forces. Israel launched an air operation
in the South of Lebanon and
later led a ground operation. Iran’s
Revolutionary Guards aided Hezbollah. The
war lasted some 30 days. There had been a UN
mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since
Israel left in 2000. Since then, a Lebanese
government was elected and Syrian
troops moved out. However, Lebanese forces did
not go into the border area with
Israel. UNIFIL was in a weak and compromised
predicament limited to observing
the cease-fire.
The ending of the
new war
was discussed with the Lebanese Prime Minister
who realised that a UN force was
a necessary element. The Security Council
discussed post conflict proposals.
The Lebanese government announced it was ready
to deploy troops in the border area
– earning a say about the outcome.
Organizing
the
departure of the Israelis, deploying a
reinforced UN force plus the arrival
of some 15,000 Lebanese troops was complex. The
size of UNIFIL was 15,000 but
these European troops wanted a “NATO” style
command. Since the
UN needed
troops – and quickly - compromises
were necessary. The rapid deployment was a major
UN success. Initially there
were few incidents. But in 2011 the Syrian war
has put everything at risk. The
Lebanese army in the South would not prevent a
resumption of war by Hezbollah
or Israel but it complicates their calculations.
Kosovo
-
The Long Goodbye. Kosovo was a
small and
poor autonomous area in Serbia with a majority
Albanian population, but with
Serbian population areas and historic Serbian
monasteries. In a revised
constitution Serbia gave itself increased
control of Kosovo. This prompted an
Albanian boycott of Serbian elections.
In
1997
weapons flowed into Kosovo. By the end of Summer
1998 a full was underway.
When Serbs killed 45 civilians, the West sent an
ultimatum then NATO went to
war. There was a vague Security Council
Resolution 1244 on the future outcome.
KFOR, a NATO force, would provide security. The
UN took over “interim
administration” with UN
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK, that had
initially few people and no real
authority. Albanians and Serbs set up
provisional governments in their areas.
UNMIK set up all the functions of government run
by international personnel -
from police to judges to customs collection. By
mid-2000 UNMIK was passing out
functions to local Kosovars. In 2000-2001 UNMIK
oversaw the adoption of a
“constitutional framework” and Provisional
Institutions of Self Government,
PISG. Serbian/Albanian relations were bad. The
lack of Serbian participation in
PISG was an issue. A spasm of violence in 2004
re-engaged the Security Council.
Serbs, some monasteries, UNMIK offices and UNMIK
vehicles were attacked.
In
2007
former Finnish President Ahtisaari put a
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo
Status Settlement before the Security Council.
It called for “supervised
independence.” Both Russia and China vetoed it.
Violence was anticipated. The
UN concluded that given where things were,
although incompatible with
Resolution1244, Kosovo should be independent.
Kosovo declared independence
2008. The UN stood aside as did the EU.
June
20
2008: “For the first time in UN history, the
Secretary General simply
informed the Security Council that in the
absence of any agreed guidance to the
contrary, he was going to take drastic action on
his own initiative. He was
going to reconfigure UNMIK to provide
a role for the European Union.” Five days later,
the Secretary General directed
his new representative to implement the plan –
ending 9 years of UN administration.
It was not the end of problems for Kosovo, but a
graded de-escalation had
started.
Haiti
– The
Difficulty of Helping Others.
January
2010 an
earthquake hit Haiti and several committed staff
in the UN
Stabilization Mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH,
were killed. A
year later, the UN chief of staff described the
lack of commitment of the
Haitian elite. Haiti is the poorest country with
one of the worst inequality
ratios. The earthquake didn’t help. Instead of
bringing people together, nothing
changed. The poor remained in slums and the rich
in villas in the hills above
Port-au-Prince.
In
early
2004 Aristide was forced to flee in an ambiguous
situation. A narrow
constituency ousted him. That February a US,
Canadian and French force was
rapidly deployed to quell the violence. The UN
force took until September. A
Chilean head of mission, Valdez, brought Latin
American commitments to the
mission.
Valdez
worked
towards elections, defusing political disputes
and working with all
sectors. The elections went relatively well, but
the new government’s politics
didn’t bring real developments. On the other
hand, the UN peacekeepers did an
exceptional job of dealing with gangs that
controlled the slums. It required
well-trained troops whose governments were
willing to take risks – like Brazil.
Troops can help. “But in the end, the critical
element is the foundation of
peace.” The UN tried to avoid past mistakes. It
expanded the mission to help
build judiciary and police. A better police did
result. But the judiciary
defied encouragement to become more accountable
and effective.
“In
Haiti
I learned to be modest. No force will produce
peace, and no technocratic
plan … will deliver a functioning state.” … “All
the tools in the toolbox …
should be used …” “In the end, ‘fellow feelings’
among the people may well be
more important determinants …”
Syria
- A
world out of Control. The UN had
peacekeepers
on the Golan Heights since 1974 when the Arab
spring reached Syria in 2011.
“What is surprising and significant is that so
little was done to support a
peaceful transformation in Syria …” By 2012
major powers wanted to do
something. Former Secretary General Kofi Annan
was appointed special envoy for
the UN and Guéhenno was to be
his
deputy. A plan was developed: a Syrian led
political process, UN-led cessation
of violence, timely humanitarian assistance,
release of arbitrary detainees,
free movement for journalists. “Syrian-led”
meant government-led to Assad. To
the opposition, it meant a political space where
oppressed Syrians could chart
a path for change.
Complex
politics
made Annan also special envoy of the Arab League
with its deputy
Nasser al-Kidwa to deal with the peace process
while Guéhenno was to oversee
the rest. The Syrian government
would not deal with al-Kidwa. Initially, there
was hope that the international
community might rally around the political
process, but “… for some countries
the fall of Assad was a more important goal than
a quick end of the war.”
Spring 2012 Annan got the Security Council to
agree on a timeline requiring
cessation of violence April 10th with
a 2-day margin. April 12th
there was an improvement. The Security Council
sent in observers and was on a
road to a full mission. UNSMIS was launched
April 21st.
In
Syria, Guéhenno
met with
opposition. This was a new revolution – not the
old parties. There was a deep
sense of lack of justice so that this was not a
doctrinaire revolution. People
wanted just rulers. He met with groups in Homs
and Homs province. Giving them
his realistic views, he saw “how our Western
rhetoric which creates high hopes
and often delivers little is extremely dangerous
and can only feed despair.” In
2012 there were still moderates, but little was
done to help them at that time.
The world is now paying the price for that
indifference. May 25th
government militias entered a village in Homs
province and massacred whole
families. The UN mission pulled out in August.
Annan
tried
to convene an “action group” in Geneva. There
was no agreement on
participation or process - neither Iran nor
Saudi Arabia was included. June 30th
2012 there was an agreed document. A
“transitional governing body” was to
emerge by “mutual consent,” but there was
nothing about implementation. Annan
resigned. The UN asked Brahimi to attempt a
restart and he attempted another
Geneva meeting. This time Assad was no longer
the embattled leader. The
opposition was divided. Islamic militant groups
played a bigger role. The
moderates had not received the resources that
could have made them a significant
force. There was some hope that Assad might
realise compromise would be needed
and opposition groups might feel war-weary.
Saudi Arabia might move from proxy
war with Iran in Syria. However, jihadist groups
had become dominant in several
towns.
“What
went
wrong?” For the West, Russia, Iran and China are
the culprits. After years
when Russia was taken for granted, its support
for Assad is a sign that those
years are over. Russia pays no price for that
stand and is unlikely to change.
And Russia and China were determined that the
West’s “responsibility to
protect” in Libya should not be a precedent.
Syria
exposes
the international community’s inability to
influence events in
individual countries. An unholy alliance of
great powers to support the status
quo at any cost is likely to lead to more
instability and terrorism. “But there
are few credible partners in Syria and in the
region to manage change.” The
Russians may be right – the movements from the
Arab spring may be more
difficult to control than we think. This is not
to say we should abandon the
principles that have guided democracies. It
would be wrong to accept an
oppressive status quo as the best defense
against the Islamic State and
international terrorism. Yet we should be humble
and recognize that it is
Syrians who are sacrificing their lives for
those principles. “… the future of
the Middle East will be determined first and
foremost by the people of the
Middle East, not by Americans, or Russians, or
Europeans.”
Making
the
UN Relevant in Today’s World. By 2003 the Security
Council was divided. There was an
indifferent U.S. President and a hostile right
wing of the Republican party.
Annan’s speech to the General Assembly announced
a panel to propose reforms
responding to peace and security challenges.
The
year
2004 was not good. The 2000 Brahimi report on
peacekeeping assumed no more
than one UN mission per year, but a transformed
Congo mission and new Haiti and
Cote d’Ivoire missions were added. Peacekeeping
was overstretched. Outsourcing
was discussed. Yet UN authorized operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan had begun
to discredit outsourcing. In
2004, it
became known that peacekeepers were abusing
women and girls in the Congo.
Jordanian Zeid al-Hussein was asked to make
recommendations. Building on Zeid’s
report, the crisis passed. Reforms beg the
question whether states can see
these problems as their problems. Guéhenno
openly
warned of the too-rapid expansion of
peacekeeping, the repeat of 1990s
mistakes and the adding of tasks without
resources. At the same time, he
believed that the most valuable contribution of
the UN is political – a place
for finding compromise.
Big
issues
like “preventive war” and dealing with “failed
states” were tangled in
the reform of the Security Council. In 1945,
international security meant
controlling state power. Now it meant dealing
with weak states that could
become safe havens for terrorist organizations.
More powerful countries are
less willing than in 1945 to limit their own
power. There is no possibility of
reform of the Security Council in the
foreseeable future. Countries long
candidates for membership are losing hope. They
may be satisfied with the G20.
March
2005,
Annan released his report “In Larger Freedom”
offering an elegant
framework for reform, but around American
liberalism rather than “cogent
principles around which the entire world could
rally.” The related summit
declaration August 2005 was surprisingly
ambitious: a Peace Building Commission
with a peace building fund and a Human Rights
Council. The acknowledgment in a
document agreed by the General Assembly of “the
responsibility to protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against
humanity” was one of the more remarkable
features. Nine years after the summit,
the responsibility to protect appears ahead of
the international consensus. The
lack of action comes from weak domestic support
and genuine uncertainty of what
to do. National sovereignty evokes strong
emotions. The political space the UN
is allowed to occupy is shrinking as the
challenges move away from those its
founders anticipated.
The
flagship
reform of Ban Ki-moon has been management
reform: the break up of
peacekeeping that by 2007 was considered too big
and powerful. Ki-moon has put
an emphasis on effectiveness, but like other
secretaries general, he still must
manage the gap between the vision of the U.S.
and the West and the vision of
most other countries.
“Today
there
is no enduring alliance of big powers … and no
solid coalition for reform
among middle-income countries. And yet …
institutional reform remains
necessary.” A world with a marginalized UN
“would be a throw back to the time
of the concert of powers.” That has been
repeatedly tried and it has repeatedly
failed. The challenge is no longer managing
centres of power, but building them
in fragile states.
Epilogue. The book ends with a
short Epilogue. The war in Syria
has claimed thousands of lives and the inability
of the international community
to address it contrasts with Libya. The strong
NATO stand there caused a
backlash at the Security Council. Most of the
powers expected to shape
tomorrow’s world did not support the initiative
in Libya – Brazil, India, China
Russia abstained on the Resolution.
Guéhenno felt a
moral duty
to occupy all the political space offered and
was supported by secretary
generals in his decisions. He tried to make
choices when making a choice had
been avoided and adding clarity when there was
little. Otherwise lives might be
lost. Not making a choice is a choice. Yet the
basis for what he did is lacking
at the UN and this can be isolating. The moral
effect of any action is
unpredictable – whether peacekeeping or some
other political strategic
decision. International intervention is special
because it affects the lives of
other human communities more than our own. We
intervene at a distance whether
by bombs in Libya or more benign engagements in
fragile countries.
Some
of
the biggest investments - Afghanistan and DRC -
were fickle with grand plans
generating immense hope. When hope turned to
resentment, ambition was replaced
by a desire to pack up and leave. Poor countries
that provide the bulk of
peacekeeping troops that rich countries pay for
do not want the risks, and Afghanistan
and Iraq has eroded the willingness of developed
countries to provide troops.
We
are
at the end of a long 500 year cycle that brought
the world into one
strategic space, brought first by Europe and
then the U.S. Although limits to
national power make national politics, global
issues do not produce global
politics because the world is just too
heterogeneous to be unified by a single
conversation. The absence of global perspective
makes the debate about
intervention so important. The world is evolving
and the UN should do more than
accompany it. Between the extremes of
isolationist denial and universalism lies
a narrow path for the UN and concerned citizens.
The
book
ends with a T.S. Elliot poem. A
man’s destination is his own village was
read when Kofi Annan inaugurated a monument
to the many peacekeepers that
died in the Yugoslav wars. Perhaps the thought
from the Jewish prophetic era in
ancient Judah captures things: love justice,
shown mercy and walk humbly with
God (the spirit that swirls among the people).