Tom Clark

Return of History
March 2017

Click square for index

The Return of History: Conflict, Migration and Geopolitics in the 21^st Century by Jennifer Welsh (Anansi, 2016) derives from the 2016 Massey Lectures, aired by the CBC. I was uneasy. Recently, I have been critical of those who choose the Massey lecturers for shifting from scholars reporting discoveries in their field to public figures. Also, the subject matter overlapped a paper I published in September 2016. (See article February 2016 “Unending War and Refugees: Facing Violent New World.”) Yet Welsh presented a framework and some thoughtful analysis of the violent new world in a scholarly yet accessible manner. She is an academic who was Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General, so the work is authoritative. Also, it is refreshing to hear a Canadian voice.

The book uses a 1989 essay by Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” as a yardstick for measuring the 2016 world. Fukuyama accepted history as evolving progressively so that the end of the Cold War signaled to him growth into a peaceful world and the expansion of Western liberal democracy. Walsh weighs the evidence. She acknowledges that there could be backslidings within a general evolution, but finds disturbing trends, more than “blips,” that should be addressed. It would be wiser to take action to promote liberal democracy.

It is surprising that there is no mention of the background to the momentous changes that took place in Europe in 1989, the Helsinki Process, or mention of the body that emerged to manage future European issues, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE. More on that below.

Her first chapter, ‘The Return of History’ is an introduction and a general stocktaking. At first glance, liberal democracy remains dominant. Looking further, there are signs “history has returned.” Wars are raging in the Middle East with barbaric attacks and annihilation of populations and cultural treasures, contrary to the rules of war developed following WWII. Elections have produced an authoritarian government in Russia that is extending territories. It has sent the UN Security Council back into unproductive mutual recriminations. The numbers of displaced people in the world have skyrocketed and no agreement to end the Syrian war is in sight. True, economic output has grown since 1970 and yes, there are far more democracies than there were in the 1970s. Yet the Arab Spring has fizzled out leaving just a weak Tunisian democracy. And there is backsliding from democratic constitutions in African countries where leaders try to undermine the opposition and extend their own terms in office.

Within established democratic countries trust in institutions is low and right wing populism has had some staggering successes -- the Brexit vote and Donald Trump - unelected when the book was written. Equal voice and equal consideration of needs are both called for in a democracy. The success of the populist call to “regain control” means that some feel their needs are not being addressed. And economist Piketty has shown incomes are diverging in many countries and the gap in wealth is even bigger. Walsh says liberal democracies have not done enough to resolve international conflicts, build peace and promote humanitarian values. Her subsequent chapters 2 – 5 examine a series of areas: the return of barbarism, the return of mass flight, the return of the cold war (and Russia), and the return of inequality.

She has themes that run across her chapters. First, if history returns it does so with a modern twist. For example the 8^th century caliphate envisioned in Syria and Iraq uses high tech information technology. Second, “history” is being used by those seeking to return to it. Russia is returning to an imperial Russia with fluid borders and neighbours deemed subservient to its interests. Her third theme wants us to recall the struggles to achieve western liberal society, rather than believe it was a natural evolution. And she wants us to ensure the sacrifices for liberal democracy were not a struggle in vain.

Her first chapter ends pointing out that not only tectonic forces but also individual actors, some statesmen, some lowly officials, played key roles to make the 1989 dramatic opening of the wall in Germany happen. I will touch briefly on the useful information Welsh packs into her chapters 2-5 below. But let’s stop here for some comment about the missing OSCE.

It is surprising there is no mention of the Helsinki process. This was a large structured series of inter-governmental consultations known as the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, CSCE. It included governments of Eastern and Western Europe, Russia, the US and Canada. It began in the middle of the Cold War in 1972 and lead to a Final Act (Declaration) in 1975. The consultations covered three “baskets” of issues or areas for improving cooperation: the Security Dimension, the Economic Dimension and the Human Dimension. The Human Dimension, in combination with principle VII of the Conference, included things like human rights with freedom of the press.

The Conference aimed to keep Europe at peace and cooperating and there is little doubt that it was this process that paved the way for the transformation of Europe in 1989. The Conference was institutionalized in 1990 with the signing of the Treaty of Paris that ended the Cold War. In 1995 the institutionalized Conference became the Organization, OSCE. It is an operational body with headquarters in Vienna. It has specialized consultative bodies in other European cities dealing with particular activities. It is a kind of regional United Nations for Europe, with peacekeepers and the like. It is the OSCE whose principles and agreements are challenged by the civil war in Ukraine and by the Russian activism around its borders that Welsh discusses, as well as the transformation in Europe that begins her account.

No doubt the Massey Lecture format requires choice and focus and inevitably limits the scope of an inquiry. There can be no doubt that Welsh is familiar with the OSCE and its role and that she made choices. Yet given the singular importance of the OSCE in Europe, part of any call to action in a book with a chapter about Russia should include a call to learn about and promote the hard won agreements reached at the OSCE – a body that remains largely invisible to the Western public. Many OSCE agreements reinforce the international agreements to limit war and protect civilians that Welsh rightly emphasizes.

Here a brief comments on the other Chapters. I found the thinking about the Return of the Cold War particularly insightful.

Chapter 2, “The Return of Barbarism”, gives gut-wrenching descriptions of the activities of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS, also know as Daesh –wiping out centuries old communities of ethnic groups, forcing Islam on civilians at gunpoint, destroying ancient shrines. She also offers a number of useful insights. “The Syrian war began as a peaceful protest inspired by the Arab Spring …” The biggest beneficiary of the pushback against these protest movements has been Daesh. She discusses the development of the rules of war, and the balance reached between the voices of military necessity and humanitarianism after WWII by the Red Cross and Red Crescent society in the treaties, the Four Geneva Conventions and the related Protocols. There is a shift away from these norms that protected civilians and civilian infrastructure like hospitals. It is not only their rejection by Daesh. It is the backsliding by liberal democracies.

Welsh Makes clear the serious danger of Daesh – its military capability, its control of territory, its economy. She also notes the 8^th Century Caliphate with territory can offer salvation to Muslims. Without territory, that religious salvation goes. She describes the terrorist fighters and compares them with fighters against fascist Spain in the 1930s and the initial fighters for democracy in Syria. Daesh is a modern product of Western and US policies, especially post 2003 Iraq. Daesh is also very modern in its use of 21st century information technology and 21st century captured weapons. The chapter ends with a reminder of the importance of the rules of war and a graphic reminder of the effect on civilians of bombardment and starvation in WWII without them.

Chapter 3, “The Return of Mass Flight”, describes the forced migration crisis and the challenge posed to Western societies. There is an outline of the origins of the notion of asylum, and there is an introduction to the work of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the evolution of the UNHCR’s work since WWII. The chapter concludes that Western societies are failing to meet the challenges of the crisis and its rules for asylum and notes the additional 21st century “security” dimension. (See article February 1916 “Unending War…” as noted above.)

Chapter 4, “The Return of the Cold War”, raises the newfound Russian activism and the war in Ukraine. A similar war in Georgia has been and gone with loss of Georgian territory. Welsh concedes that there has been no return to anything like the old Cold War, but she offers insights. She describes Russia’s shift to a dominant political party, to questionable elections, to control of the media, to attacks on opposition, to tools that exert influence internationally, and to Russian cyber attacks. She suggests Russia is modeling a dangerous illiberal democracy called “sovereign democracy” that is based on the norms within a country rather than internationally agreed norms. Local Russian values interpret human rights, not protecting international human rights norms. These are seen as foreign. So Russia does not honour the rights of homosexuals as adopted in the West. Russian foreign policy seeks to be Russian. This explains why Russia actively supports other independent nationalistic movements like France’s Marie Le Pen, the British Brexit, and Trump in the US. All promote something akin to “sovereign” democracy.

Chapter 5, “The Return of Inequality”, looks at internal problems in the West like growing inequalities in income and wealth. Welsh notes that inequality is bad for an economy according to prominent economists like Stiglitz and Piketty. She adds the voice of the International Monetary Fund. Moreover unequal income can lead to unequal opportunities and to unequal political influence, undermining a liberal democracy. The important thinking draws from Piketty. (See my article December 2014 on “Capital in the 21st Century.”) She quotes the Stiglitz finding that income inequality is not a sign of economic success. With few exceptions those generating huge wealth are not innovators like Microsoft founder Bill Gates. She laments that anyone challenging the excesses of free-market capitalism is seen at best as part of a fringe. Yet this inequality is a matter of choice. Norway and France have avoided extreme changes and Latin American countries have reversed inequality.

For me there are thoughts going beyond the truth that inequality is a bad thing. The writings of Judt (See my article October 2011) and Hedges (See the September 2016 article) suggest a collapse of social infrastructure around unions for blue-collar workers in the 1950-1980 Western manufacturing towns with the pullout of manufacturing. There was likely also disillusionment in the discrediting of Marxism, which had served as a religion in some of the former manufacturing areas of Europe now supporting Marie Le Pen and her like.

Not everyone will agree with Welsh’s ingenious use of a “Return of History” optic to measure changes from the end of the Cold War period with international politics now. Some may believe that political history continues regardless of Fukuyama theories. But whatever their view, her call stands. The people of the UN, whatever their generation, must remember and promote the hard won rules for war and for humanitarian aid, for asylum and the protection of refugees. They must promote press freedom among other human rights and the right to privacy that is now a major issue. Welsh is also right to have us question wealth inequality and its implications for democracy. Finally, she wants her readers to learn more about the human struggles that allowed liberal democracies to arrive - and to emulate them. Amen to all that.

TOP Click:



Return of History March 2017 Click square for index The Return of History: Conflict, Migration and Geopolitics in the 21^st Century by Jennifer Welsh (Anansi, 2016) derives from the 2016 Massey Lectures, aired by the CBC. I was uneasy. Recently, I have been critical of those who choose the Massey lecturers for shifting from scholars reporting discoveries in their field to public figures. Also, the subject matter overlapped a paper I published in September 2016. (See article February 2016 “Unending War and Refugees: Facing Violent New World.”) Yet Welsh presented a framework and some thoughtful analysis of the violent new world in a scholarly yet accessible manner. She is an academic who was Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General, so the work is authoritative. Also, it is refreshing to hear a Canadian voice. The book uses a 1989 essay by Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” as a yardstick for measuring the 2016 world. Fukuyama accepted history as evolving progressively so that the end of the Cold War signaled to him growth into a peaceful world and the expansion of Western liberal democracy. Walsh weighs the evidence. She acknowledges that there could be backslidings within a general evolution, but finds disturbing trends, more than “blips,” that should be addressed. It would be wiser to take action to promote liberal democracy. It is surprising that there is no mention of the background to the momentous changes that took place in Europe in 1989, the Helsinki Process, or mention of the body that emerged to manage future European issues, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE. More on that below. Her first chapter, ‘The Return of History’ is an introduction and a general stocktaking. At first glance, liberal democracy remains dominant. Looking further, there are signs “history has returned.” Wars are raging in the Middle East with barbaric attacks and annihilation of populations and cultural treasures, contrary to the rules of war developed following WWII. Elections have produced an authoritarian government in Russia that is extending territories. It has sent the UN Security Council back into unproductive mutual recriminations. The numbers of displaced people in the world have skyrocketed and no agreement to end the Syrian war is in sight. True, economic output has grown since 1970 and yes, there are far more democracies than there were in the 1970s. Yet the Arab Spring has fizzled out leaving just a weak Tunisian democracy. And there is backsliding from democratic constitutions in African countries where leaders try to undermine the opposition and extend their own terms in office. Within established democratic countries trust in institutions is low and right wing populism has had some staggering successes -- the Brexit vote and Donald Trump - unelected when the book was written. Equal voice and equal consideration of needs are both called for in a democracy. The success of the populist call to “regain control” means that some feel their needs are not being addressed. And economist Piketty has shown incomes are diverging in many countries and the gap in wealth is even bigger. Walsh says liberal democracies have not done enough to resolve international conflicts, build peace and promote humanitarian values. Her subsequent chapters 2 – 5 examine a series of areas: the return of barbarism, the return of mass flight, the return of the cold war (and Russia), and the return of inequality. She has themes that run across her chapters. First, if history returns it does so with a modern twist. For example the 8^th century caliphate envisioned in Syria and Iraq uses high tech information technology. Second, “history” is being used by those seeking to return to it. Russia is returning to an imperial Russia with fluid borders and neighbours deemed subservient to its interests. Her third theme wants us to recall the struggles to achieve western liberal society, rather than believe it was a natural evolution. And she wants us to ensure the sacrifices for liberal democracy were not a struggle in vain. Her first chapter ends pointing out that not only tectonic forces but also individual actors, some statesmen, some lowly officials, played key roles to make the 1989 dramatic opening of the wall in Germany happen. I will touch briefly on the useful information Welsh packs into her chapters 2-5 below. But let’s stop here for some comment about the missing OSCE. It is surprising there is no mention of the Helsinki process. This was a large structured series of inter-governmental consultations known as the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, CSCE. It included governments of Eastern and Western Europe, Russia, the US and Canada. It began in the middle of the Cold War in 1972 and lead to a Final Act (Declaration) in 1975. The consultations covered three “baskets” of issues or areas for improving cooperation: the Security Dimension, the Economic Dimension and the Human Dimension. The Human Dimension, in combination with principle VII of the Conference, included things like human rights with freedom of the press. The Conference aimed to keep Europe at peace and cooperating and there is little doubt that it was this process that paved the way for the transformation of Europe in 1989. The Conference was institutionalized in 1990 with the signing of the Treaty of Paris that ended the Cold War. In 1995 the institutionalized Conference became the Organization, OSCE. It is an operational body with headquarters in Vienna. It has specialized consultative bodies in other European cities dealing with particular activities. It is a kind of regional United Nations for Europe, with peacekeepers and the like. It is the OSCE whose principles and agreements are challenged by the civil war in Ukraine and by the Russian activism around its borders that Welsh discusses, as well as the transformation in Europe that begins her account. No doubt the Massey Lecture format requires choice and focus and inevitably limits the scope of an inquiry. There can be no doubt that Welsh is familiar with the OSCE and its role and that she made choices. Yet given the singular importance of the OSCE in Europe, part of any call to action in a book with a chapter about Russia should include a call to learn about and promote the hard won agreements reached at the OSCE – a body that remains largely invisible to the Western public. Many OSCE agreements reinforce the international agreements to limit war and protect civilians that Welsh rightly emphasizes. Here a brief comments on the other Chapters. I found the thinking about the Return of the Cold War particularly insightful. Chapter 2, “The Return of Barbarism”, gives gut-wrenching descriptions of the activities of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS, also know as Daesh –wiping out centuries old communities of ethnic groups, forcing Islam on civilians at gunpoint, destroying ancient shrines. She also offers a number of useful insights. “The Syrian war began as a peaceful protest inspired by the Arab Spring …” The biggest beneficiary of the pushback against these protest movements has been Daesh. She discusses the development of the rules of war, and the balance reached between the voices of military necessity and humanitarianism after WWII by the Red Cross and Red Crescent society in the treaties, the Four Geneva Conventions and the related Protocols. There is a shift away from these norms that protected civilians and civilian infrastructure like hospitals. It is not only their rejection by Daesh. It is the backsliding by liberal democracies. Welsh Makes clear the serious danger of Daesh – its military capability, its control of territory, its economy. She also notes the 8^th Century Caliphate with territory can offer salvation to Muslims. Without territory, that religious salvation goes. She describes the terrorist fighters and compares them with fighters against fascist Spain in the 1930s and the initial fighters for democracy in Syria. Daesh is a modern product of Western and US policies, especially post 2003 Iraq. Daesh is also very modern in its use of 21st century information technology and 21st century captured weapons. The chapter ends with a reminder of the importance of the rules of war and a graphic reminder of the effect on civilians of bombardment and starvation in WWII without them. Chapter 3, “The Return of Mass Flight”, describes the forced migration crisis and the challenge posed to Western societies. There is an outline of the origins of the notion of asylum, and there is an introduction to the work of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the evolution of the UNHCR’s work since WWII. The chapter concludes that Western societies are failing to meet the challenges of the crisis and its rules for asylum and notes the additional 21st century “security” dimension. (See article February 1916 “Unending War…” as noted above.) Chapter 4, “The Return of the Cold War”, raises the newfound Russian activism and the war in Ukraine. A similar war in Georgia has been and gone with loss of Georgian territory. Welsh concedes that there has been no return to anything like the old Cold War, but she offers insights. She describes Russia’s shift to a dominant political party, to questionable elections, to control of the media, to attacks on opposition, to tools that exert influence internationally, and to Russian cyber attacks. She suggests Russia is modeling a dangerous illiberal democracy called “sovereign democracy” that is based on the norms within a country rather than internationally agreed norms. Local Russian values interpret human rights, not protecting international human rights norms. These are seen as foreign. So Russia does not honour the rights of homosexuals as adopted in the West. Russian foreign policy seeks to be Russian. This explains why Russia actively supports other independent nationalistic movements like France’s Marie Le Pen, the British Brexit, and Trump in the US. All promote something akin to “sovereign” democracy. Chapter 5, “The Return of Inequality”, looks at internal problems in the West like growing inequalities in income and wealth. Welsh notes that inequality is bad for an economy according to prominent economists like Stiglitz and Piketty. She adds the voice of the International Monetary Fund. Moreover unequal income can lead to unequal opportunities and to unequal political influence, undermining a liberal democracy. The important thinking draws from Piketty. (See my article December 2014 on “Capital in the 21st Century.”) She quotes the Stiglitz finding that income inequality is not a sign of economic success. With few exceptions those generating huge wealth are not innovators like Microsoft founder Bill Gates. She laments that anyone challenging the excesses of free-market capitalism is seen at best as part of a fringe. Yet this inequality is a matter of choice. Norway and France have avoided extreme changes and Latin American countries have reversed inequality. For me there are thoughts going beyond the truth that inequality is a bad thing. The writings of Judt (See my article October 2011) and Hedges (See the September 2016 article) suggest a collapse of social infrastructure around unions for blue-collar workers in the 1950-1980 Western manufacturing towns with the pullout of manufacturing. There was likely also disillusionment in the discrediting of Marxism, which had served as a religion in some of the former manufacturing areas of Europe now supporting Marie Le Pen and her like. Not everyone will agree with Welsh’s ingenious use of a “Return of History” optic to measure changes from the end of the Cold War period with international politics now. Some may believe that political history continues regardless of Fukuyama theories. But whatever their view, her call stands. The people of the UN, whatever their generation, must remember and promote the hard won rules for war and for humanitarian aid, for asylum and the protection of refugees. They must promote press freedom among other human rights and the right to privacy that is now a major issue. Welsh is also right to have us question wealth inequality and its implications for democracy. Finally, she wants her readers to learn more about the human struggles that allowed liberal democracies to arrive - and to emulate them. Amen to all that. TOP Click:
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