Summer
2018
depression was not helped by the title “A World in
Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the
Crisis of the Old Order,” Richard Haas,
Penguin 2018 (original 2017). The
international
difficulties he describes are consistent
with parts of my April 2016 article
reviewing “The Fog of Peace” by a former
head of UN peacekeeping. However, Haas
offers a practical “what to try” guide to
the disarray. This
is
a US book for a US audience about US
foreign policy. But the ideas are more
generally useful. The thesis is that the
world has shifted from the rules and
guidelines that held some sway up to this
millennium. Haas had little hope beyond
living with disorder when his book went to
press in the fall of 2016. The 2018
Penguin
edition contains an afterword in which
Haas sees the US under Trump as a
contributor to world “disorder”! Haas
is
a Republican who was Middle East advisor
in the H.W. Bush Administration. He
is currently president of the US Council
for Foreign Relations. His contention
is that the US benefits from an ordered
world and that the US is uniquely
situated to facilitate that. His thinking
is directed at keeping America working
for world order and he gives a thoughtful
platform for working at that,
globally, and then world region by region.
His approach is thoughtful, pragmatic
and “do-no-harm”. Haas
says
he is non-partisan and he finds problems
with foreign policy decisions of
both Republican and Democratic presidents.
But I’m not sure, in the examples he
cites, that the George W Bush invasion of
Iraq is on a par with Obama’s alleged
inadequate response to Iran to get it to
limit its nuclear-related
developments. Maybe Obama’s intervention
in Libya was a mistake and maybe the
failure to strike in Syria early in that
conflict was a mistake. But for me these
are not in the same league as the Iraq
invasion. But such niggles are not
central and do not detract from good
foreign policy ideas. The
book
is in three parts that I will summarise.
The first part is about how
things used to be ordered. The second is
how things changed after the Cold War
ended (1990), and the last part is about
prescriptions for US foreign policy
today. The
first
part of the book introduces world
“systems,” meaning rules and limits that
are generally accepted, that allowed the
great powers to get along up to the
end of the Cold War. Haas refers to the
Treaty of Westphalia in the Europe of 1648
that ended 30 years of war, to the
Congress of Vienna after the Napoleonic
wars, to the treaty of Paris after WWI and
to the agreements during the Cold
War. Interestingly, Hass describes the
Cold War as a managed competition that
provided
a source of order. Haas
repeatedly
refers to nuclear weapons as a positive
part of that Cold War order
whereas I tend to think that the weapons
were tempting fortune. So I welcome
Haas’ reminders of the importance of the
UN non-proliferation treaty for
nuclear weapons and the value of efforts
to remove these weapons from North Korea
and keep them from Iran. After
WWII,
organized economic and trade systems were
put in place to build more world
order. These included the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
that has now become the World Trade
Organization. The United Nations was
established with a Charter aimed at peace
and with a Security Council to respond to
problems. The UN was aimed at what
goes on among and between sovereign
States. It was set up, like Westphalia, to
turn a blind eye to what goes on within
their own territory. At the time the
use of military force was limited to
defense only. Haas suggests that it was
surprising that these systems were
inadequate once the “overlay and
discipline
of the Cold War order disappeared.” The
second
part of the book describes the immediate
post Cold War world.
Historically, “disorder” meant conflicts
between great powers, for example WWI
and WWII. Haas notes the absence over the
past 25 years of direct conflicts
between major powers. These he describes
as US, Russia, China, Japan, Europe,
India. Yet the world is in disarray. Great
power relations have been tense
between the US and Russia and the US and
China. China
and
the US are tied by trade and by the
Chinese holdings of US debt. There are
differences between them about Taiwan,
North Korea, and China’s claims to
disputed islands in the South China seas.
Then there was the negative US
approach to the Chinese plan to build the
Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. Some
difficulty
with Russia was perhaps inevitable given
the massive changes at the
end of the Cold War. But the controversial
decision to keep and expand NATO was
a mistake that runs counter to assurances
given when it was agreed to allow a united
Germany under NATO. There are particular
issues around Georgia and Ukraine.
Both of them now have forms of Russian
military support or presence in parts of
their countries. Crimea was essentially
annexed from Ukraine. Both countries
were interested in joining the EU and
NATO. Haas is opposed to that. Despite
the
US difficulties with China and Russia,
Haas affirms that relations among
the great powers are not too bad. However,
the absence of major power conflict
is very different from major power
cooperation. The
global
scene since the Cold War has become less
orderly. Order comes from
shared rules and principles, a known
process and a balance of power. That old
order allowed an international response to
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. After
that, the old order faced big challenges. The
Soviet
empire collapsed into Russia plus a
commonwealth of independent states
plus some independent countries. True,
there was a smooth formation of the Czech
Republic and Slovakia, but the implosion
of Yugoslavia brought serious wars
engaging the UN and NATO. Hass claims that
here, as elsewhere, wars arose from
score-settling or a struggle to create a
new political entity. There was no
common expectation among States about what
to do. The response to the early
issue of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait had
been a strictly humanitarian response.
Responses
since have been less clear. In general the
governments involved in conflicts
have been weak governments – essentially
the countries served as a space where
warlords or factions and militias
competed. An
early
instance of this was Somalia. A disastrous
humanitarian intervention led
to the deaths of US soldiers. This paved
the way for too much caution in the UN
Rwanda peacekeeping mission, where the
massacre of minority Tutsis might have
been prevented by a more robust
humanitarian intervention. When the Libya
conflict broke, the reaction was likely
too aggressive – there was not
international
agreement to go as far as the regime
change that occurred. The
Rwanda
experience did produce an advance in
international agreement – agreement
on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
The R2P placed a sovereign
responsibility on a government to protect
its civilians. It permitted international
humanitarian intervention if the country
did not protect its citizens. Yet in
practice
this new principle is difficult to apply –
witness Syria. Conflict broke out
when Syrian troops were sent to break up
protests. After 5 years of conflict,
the regime is backed by Iran and Russian
forces, and sections of the territory
have been run by terrorist-affiliated
groups. The US bombs the “terrorists.” An
issue
that arose early after the Cold War was
what to do about countries harbouring
terrorist groups. Afghanistan’s Taliban
government harboured Al Qaida, which
sent terrorists to attack New York in
2001. There was international
understanding
when the US attacked Afghanistan in 2001
to remove Al Qaida and to change the
government. Indeed, a broader
international condemnation of governments
supporting terror groups at that time
favourably influenced the process for
peace in Northern Island. In
contrast,
there was a widespread view that the US
was wrong and unjustified in
attacking Iraq in 2003. The issue was the
pre-emptive use of military force on
account of a fear Iraq was developing
weapons of mass destruction. This was not
good enough. Haas
goes
on to explain the dangers of proliferation
of nuclear weapons – contrary
to the aim of the UN non-proliferation
treaty. In particular, he examines North
Korea and Pakistan, Israel and Iran. Haas
calls
the 2016 Paris agreement on climate change
an inadequate international
response to the dangerous global climate
change that is linked to human activities.
And he notes that there has been a weak
global response to managing the use of
cyberspace
and to managing world health. The
expansion of global trade and the WTO has
been mixed. Trade agreements have been
mainly regional – like NAFTA. Efforts to
establish international standards – for
example in banking – have remained only
guidelines. There is a gap internationally
between what is desirable and what
has been possible. For
me,
it is the number of protracted civil
conflicts causing chaos and suffering
in weak States around the world that is
new. These situations are a challenge
for the UN and call for creative new
responses. Haas’ next chapter looking at
the
world regions adds some relevant insights. In
the
Middle East, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
was the first post-Cold War
conflict requiring an international
response. It left Iraq with an army intact
as
a counterweight to Iran, a regional
heavyweight. In contrast, the 2003
invasion
of Iraq was about regime change and Haas
says the US occupation fuelled a civil
war and, contrary to some expectations,
was a major setback for the ideal of
democracy in the region. The Arab Spring
brought protests throughout the region
in 2011. The US paid a price for actual
and perceived roles in Egypt and
elsewhere. The Arab Spring was different
in each country. In
Bahrain,
when anti-government protests broke out
the Saudis and UAE sent troops
to support the government under the aegis
of the Sunni-led security
organization the Gulf Cooperation Council.
In Libya, Haas says the world in
general and the US in particular contributed
to disorder by doing both too much
and then too little. The UN humanitarian
intervention was not clearly necessary
and the intervention rapidly became regime
change, contrary to the expectations
of Russia and China. Russia subsequently
used the rationale of humanitarian
intervention for its actions in Ukraine. Syria
illustrates
the problems that come from what is not
done. There was no early
support for the uprising. Obama’s
statements went unmatched by action. His
red-line statement after Syria’s alleged
use of chemical weapons was not followed
up with air strikes – I suspect because
the UK parliament blocked that in the
UK. This missed an opportunity to weaken
the regime at a critical moment. Haas
regards this as an Obama failure. Other
powers used their military presence in
Syria. Russia & Iran were there to
shore up the government. There were also
terrorist groups like ISIS. US policy
changed little until the 2016 arming of
Kurdish groups. Iraq
and
the US agreed to planned US troop
pull-outs from Iraq by 2011 under G.W.
Bush. The pull-outs were accelerated under
Obama in 2009. Al-Qaeda strengthened
and became ISIS pushing into Syria. By
2014 the US had sent troops to work with
the government and began air strikes.
Maybe Iraq might have been stabilized by
more military support after 2007-2008, but
Haas is not sure. Haas ends with a
reflection on the Middle East that favours
a formal foreign policy process in
the US such as the one that existed under
H W Bush and Clinton. He disfavours
the more informal foreign policy
approaches of G W Bush and Obama. In
contrast
with the Middle East, the Asia Pacific
region has been relatively
quiet despite a huge increase in economic
output – 300% per capita – and
despite border disputes: China - India
border, Japan - Russia over Northern
Territories, China - Japan over East China
Sea islands; and despite no treaty
ending the Korean war for 70 years. There
is
no diplomatic structure in the Asia
Pacific region other than the economic
ones like APEC. There are no hot lines and
no confidence building tools. These
are countries with strong national
identities and strong governments that
have
had a focus on economic development. Haas
thinks the US presence, continuing in
the region after the departure
“ignominiously” from Vietnam in 1975, has
helped. Yet a lot of US attention went to
the Middle East and Afghanistan. Given
the importance of the Asia Pacific region
and its relevance to US concerns, the
Obama shift of attention to this region
from the Middle East is considered
“smart.” But follow-through was weak. The
Trans Pacific Partnership trade
agreement was a good move of Obama, but it
came late. (Trump has since walked
away from it.) South
Asia
is dominated by India and Pakistan. There
have been wars over the disputed
territory of Kashmir and both countries
have developed nuclear weapons. There
is no regular interaction between them.
The Pakistan government is weak and
unable to take on terrorist groups in the
country. The US deepened its links to
India with a 2005 agreement to cooperate
on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Progress with Pakistan is more difficult.
Given that it is a country with
nuclear weapons and terrorist groups, the
alternatives to continuing
cooperation are worse. Afghanistan
offered
little incentive for nation building.
Obama tried to balance maintaining the
government and reducing troops, but by
2016, he announced 8,400 troops would
remain “indefinitely” and the Taliban
still control 20% of the country. Europe
has
been building structural links with two
conflicting visions – a united states
of Europe and the united Europe of states.
The arrival of the European Union in
1992 added a foreign policy and security
policy component and EU peacekeeping
took over from NATO in parts of the
Balkans. There is a common currency among
several EU members. However, there are
serious structural problems. National
governments kept control of their foreign
and security policies. Economic
growth is slow. The lack of banking
mechanisms guaranteeing an individual’s
deposits leaves each country on its own.
Populations are declining. Populist
parties have arrived – leading to the
“Brexit” of the UK from the EU. Big
challenges have arrived: Russia
essentially invaded Crimea. Latin
America
has generally improved with some sound
economic growth – notably in
Mexico and Chile – and with a shift to
democratic governments. The civil war
appears to have ended in Colombia. Brazil
lifted thousands out of poverty. By
treaty, the region is nuclear weapons
free. But there are problems. Venezuela
has autocratic rule and a collapsed
economy that is over-dependent on oil.
Central America has criminality, drugs and
weak, often corrupt governments.
Mexico has drugs and gangs, a poor
judicial system and a government unable to
control the whole country. Brazil has
corruption, a bloated bureaucracy, debt
and a shrinking economy. The regional
coordinating body, the Organization of
American States, OAS, requires consensus
to act. (I add that the presence of
one hugely powerful and wealthy member,
the US, among all the other members of
the OAS adds to the difficulties of this
body.) Haas
sees
Africa as sharing features of Latin
America and the Middle East. There
have been some impressive strides: the end
of apartheid in South Africa; Rwanda’s
coming together after the massacre;
countries like Botswana, Cape Verde,
Kenya,
Namibia, Senegal scoring well on
governance and economic performance. But
corruption is widespread and there is
disorder, largely within states, from
minorities, tribal & religious clashes
and terrorism. Mercifully big power
geopolitics is largely absent. Before
his
third section, Haas sets out some broad
policy observations. First, no
country will forego acting on its own
interests for lack of a UN blessing, so
that legitimacy cannot be said to come
from a UN process. The US favours
principle as a basis for legitimacy, but
weaker states favour process. The UN
Security Council is a place that can bless
a proposed action. But it does not
reflect the current reality of the world.
There is no Germany or EU or any
state from Latin America like Brazil or
Mexico at the Security Council. There
is no India, South Korea, Australia,
Turkey or South Africa. Some countries
with a big share of world trade and
population are not there at the Security
Council. The G7, G8 and G20 bodies meet
only annually around trade and
coordination.
They lack authority. Then, non-state
actors (example of a non-state actor
here?) now share the action in a world
that is showing a greater distribution
of power. Beyond
the
bi-polar world of the Cold War, there is
no unipolar world. The US is the
biggest power, but there is no consensus
about what the US should do. Alliances
are now looser. Nor is there a multipolar
world. The world includes very many
medium powers like Brazil, Chile, Mexico,
and so on – but no select “poles.” Moreover,
entities like the UN, EU, World
Bank, IMF have clout and so do bodies like
OPEC. Then there are NGOs. More than
this, what matters is not just about
“power.” What matters is relevant power –
that
is the power that national politics will
allow to be brought to bear in a distant
places for a particular challenge for long
enough. The notion of relevant power
matters for influencing political
structures in other societies. Military
power
can help, but it cannot transform a
culture or alter loyalties or change
entrenched
behaviours. The
last
section of the book looks at what the US
might do in this new world of
disorder. First it considers what can be
done in general terms, and then what
can be done region by region and country
by country. Haas also offers a
possible world order number two. Haas
repeats
that disorder is increasing since the end
of the Cold War even though
the traditional source of disorder, wars
between major world powers, has been
largely absent so far. The disorder has
resulted from international structural
changes such as the diffusion of capacity
to act into more hands than ever
before plus the actions or omissions of
the US and other powers. This has
produced a host of problems: potential
spread of nuclear weapons; terrorism; a
spike in refugees and displaced persons; a
chaotic Middle East; a Europe under
siege; a precariously balanced Asia
Pacific; an ungoverned cyberspace; an
inadequate response to climate change; a
rejection of free trade and
immigration; and potential for a pandemic.
Haas adds that despite these trends,
statecraft, diplomacy and foreign policy
can make a difference for the better. The
top
priority for Haas is avoiding major power
rivalry, competition and conflict,
but he cautions for reciprocity so as to
avoid just a policy of appeasement.
For the US, this means avoiding
competition and conflict with China and
Russia.
This translates into increased military
forces in Europe and increased air and
navel forces in the Asia-Pacific, enhanced
by visiting forces and exercises.
Haas says this is not containment because
neither China nor Russia has an
insatiable number of needs or the desire
for expansion. Policy should seek to
integrate them into regional and global
orders. Maintain what cooperation there
is. Keep any sanctions narrow and linked
to particular behaviour – not the
relationship as a whole. The focus should
be foreign policy – not domestic. Haas
calls
for a Word Order 2 in a substantial
chapter on what a new approach might
be. It is not rights of States with
respect to each other, but rather their
obligations to one another - “sovereign
obligation.” This is not a
responsibility like the responsibility to
protect citizens. The sovereign
obligation is towards other governments
and through them to citizens of other
countries. The approach is realistic as
opposed to idealistic and it focuses on
foreign policy not on internal politics.
It is not about promoting democracy
and human rights. Sovereign
obligation
reinforces classical sovereignty and it
calls for obligations beyond
borders. For example, a possible principle
of no acquisition of territory by
military force reinforces traditional
sovereignty, but goes beyond it. A
government’s free hand internally is in
theory constrained by the R2P and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but
the operation of the R2P is tricky
and case-by-case. Meeting internationally
or regionally about R2P would be a
sovereign obligation. A new principle to
aim for would be to hold any R2P
intervention to a strictly humanitarian
measure. Self-determination
needs
to shift beyond the call of the body
seeking a state of its own towards
something that requires granting by others
and consideration of factors. There
can likely be agreement on the
unacceptability of terrorism with care
that any
action addresses bona fide terrorists and
uses safeguards to protect civilians. Bolstering
the
norm against weapons of mass destruction
will be controversial. Haas
considers the possibility of a pre-emptive
strike if there were proliferation
to a terrorist group and he considers
preventive action. He expects support for
non-proliferation but little support for
military responses to prevent or to
roll back proliferation. However,
discussing such possible actions at
bilateral
and multilateral meetings can help in and
of itself. Climate
change
is the cumulative consequence of what is
done locally and calls for a
sovereign obligation to work with others.
Getting consensus on how countries
share is hard and the Paris conference
solution was ingenious – countries
setting an ambitious achievable goal for
themselves. Helping countries adapt to
the effects of climate change falls to
wealthier countries. And why not
penalties and sanctions against countries
acting irresponsibly? Cyberspace
calls
for an international regime to discourage
some uses and encourage others.
There could be a cyber annex to the rules
of war, given the impact on
civilians. And, as with terrorism,
governments would be responsible for
ensuring no third party broke the rules
for cyberspace. Modest consultations
with key governments, companies and NGOs
might make a beginning. For
world
health the notion of sovereign obligation
is well advanced. The challenge
is making sure the WHO and governments can
follow the required steps to stop
the spread of a disease – technical and
financial assistance can be involved.
Given the value of tourism, naming and
shaming is an effective sanction for
under-performance. Sovereign
obligations
in the economic sphere are particular:
maintaining a currency;
ensuring financial reserves; fostering
honest accounting; combatting
corruption; honouring contracts; expanding
trade and attracting investment.
There is some sovereign self-interest in
here. Trade agreements are about
sovereign obligations. Outstanding issues
in trade agreements are the use of
currency manipulation and government
subsidies and also agriculture,
environment and labour practices. These
can be used for unintended trade
advantages. The
US
itself needs to follow the sovereign
obligations; otherwise it forfeits
influence. So it should reconsider things
it has opted out of like the
International Criminal Court. Also the US
needs to accept the special
obligations that come from the role of its
dollar as the world’s reserve currency.
It should hold regular international
consultations with others around banking.
All trade disputes should go to the WTO. There
is
no institutional or procedural solution.
Consultations invariably help.
Multilateralism can favour sovereign
obligations, and best practices works for
things like climate change and health
risks. Pragmatism also helps – bringing
together the key concerned actors
including NGOs - rather than worrying
about
inclusivity. That will follow. You can’t
deal with disease without the WHO and
Doctors without Borders! Haas
moves
on to considering regional issue responses
beginning with Asia Pacific. A
regional security system like the Helsinki
Accord system in Europe, but
tailored to the region is long overdue.
Including China in regional matters is
critical. A long-term visible US presence
is necessary: diplomatic, economic,
military and regular high-level
consultations. For India and Pakistan, a
baseline support for Pakistan with
increases linked to specific performances
seems a possible way to go. But the US
must be willing and able to act alone
near Pakistan, as Obama did with respect
to the capture of Bin Laden.
Afghanistan is a long-term situation to be
managed with economic and military
help to the government and a US military
presence. The
Middle
East is not an area for ambitious goals or
diplomatic offensives. It is
a condition to be managed given US
interests like oil and oil prices and the
impact on other regions. The countries
were developed post WWI giving little
homogeneity in their societies – rather
there are sub-nations ties and
supra-national ties stronger than national
ties. A realistic policy without too
much or too little at acceptable cost
begins with counter-terrorism. It assists
countries to withstand pressure from Iran
and its proxies. It discourages
further nuclear weapons. However, the
approach to Iran needs to be more than
uni-dimensional - closer to the approach
to China and Russia. There
should
be support for Israel. There should be
potential use of military force
if cost benefit shows it significantly
better than any alternative. There
should be no emphasis on reforming local
societies any time soon but a need for
humanitarian intervention may arise.
Jordon & Lebanon may need help with
refugee populations. Current
national
borders should not be considered a vital
US interest in the Middle
East. Haas has some sympathy for the Kurds
and Palestinians. There may be some
opportunity
for forms of nationhood for Kurds in Syria
and Iraq. Nothing can be done for
the Palestinians until the political time
is ripe beyond periodic discussions
amongst states with interests. Latin
America
and Africa warrant policy focussed on
promoting good governance and
economic growth. Some countries may
benefit from help at building state
capacity to contend with terrorists, drug
cartels and criminal organizations.
Supporting regional and sub-regional
organizations can help too. Europe
can
best be helped by Europeans. More spending
on defence that is not
duplicative and bolstering the capacity of
countries bordering Russia is
needed. NATO enlargement should be put on
hold. Europe must better tackle
terrorism. The EU needs reform with some
limits on free movement of peoples,
some collective bank deposit insurance. Banks
need reforms and controls and there
needs to be real discipline on fiscal
policies. Flexibility by differing levels
of EU membership might help. Close US - EU
consultations on a full agenda of
global and regional issues could be a big
plus. The US has benefitted from a close
partnership with Europe. The
final
chapter examines the importance of the US
itself being a part of the
development of a world of Sovereign
Obligation. The US must not simply say
that
the International Criminal Court is not
for us, for example. This Chapter moves
on to consider the importance of the US
national debt projections and the need
to deal with the US economy and the US
debt issue early on. Haas makes
suggestions
that seem partisan, but the debt issue
seems real.