Tom Clark

Yemen a Year Later
August 2019

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I felt obliged to take a look at the situation in Yemen now in mid 2019. I spent a lot of last year struggling to get a handle on the situation in Yemen. And I enjoyed paid employment - well, it was a modest honorarium.

I worked with Sonal Marwah of Project Ploughshares to produce a report about the war in Yemen. The text of the joint article was essentially complete by June 2018. Project Ploughshares went on to publish a fine report complete with pictures and maps. It had charts of bombings of civilians and it showed the UN humanitarian program. The War in Yemen: 2011-2018 The Elusive Road to Peace, Working Paper 18-1 appeared dated November 2018. My focus in this update is more limited. It is concerned with updating the country situation and the prospects for peace.

Our paper found that the absence of peace in Yemen began when the UN failed to take up its traditional role as the body that builds peace. The UN Security Council simply endorsed a peace process developed by the Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC, in April 2011 to end Yemen’s political crisis from the growing protests there in the Arab Spring. The GCC is a body of Gulf countries with a major role played by Saudi Arabia. That peace process collapsed with a revolt against the tentative new internationally recognized Hadi government in early 2015.

We explored the internationalization of the civil war that began in March 2015, when a coalition of GCC members intervened militarily with ground forces, air force attacks and a navel blockade to support the Hadi government. UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions accepted the GCC coalition’s armed intervention. UN Security Council Resolution 2216 called for a return to the GCC plan for peace and also established a UN Panel of Experts to monitor and report on the international arms embargo imposed on the Houthi rebels.

We examined the shortcomings of the GCC plan to bring peace to the country. Then the paper showed how the war led to a deteriorating humanitarian situation for Yemeni citizens since 2015. Finally, we looked at prospects for peace as of mid-2018.

Our paper concluded that the UN, despite its imperfections, is the main body capable of building a process that might lead to peace in Yemen by satisfying the internal and external players involved in this internationalized civil war. That process would have to face up to the present situation of players on the ground. It would have to be willing to move from some constraints in the earlier UNSC resolution that tied a peace process to the original GCC plan. The main challenge would be to find the political will necessary to do that, to bring all the parties to the table and to hammer out a lasting agreement.

Sonal and I placed a premium on UN Security Council documents – reports, resolutions and statements of the President. We found reports by the UN Panel of Experts established under Security Council resolution 2216 particularly useful. The Panel produced a “Final Report” each year at the end of January. Then a Security Council resolution renewed the mandate for another year giving rise to the next Final Report. The Panel offered assessments of the situation in Yemen with a combination of diplomacy and integrity that a body assembled by the UN provides.

It was the Panel that at the end of January 2018 reported that Yemen had fragmented. The Houthi rebels controlled the area around the former capital Sana’a in the highlands. Along the Southern coast, a newly formed Southern Transition Council of regional leaders had begun to attract support. They said there was a possibility the south would secede from Yemen. Also in the south the United Arab Emirates, UAE, ground forces had associated with and seemingly supported the Southern Transition Council. The UAE had begun forming and supporting a variety of local militias in the south.

The UN Panel of experts felt as 2018 began that a military victory in this war was not a possibility - the war was un-winnable - and that it was difficult to see a single Yemen continuing. The view of our paper was that peace efforts should begin afresh without all the constraints called for in earlier Security Council resolutions, with the reality on the ground in Yemen and with the key actors inside and outside Yemen around the table. So what has changed?

My quick-and-easy update as of July 2019 is based on the end of January 2019 Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen plus a little public news reporting.

A new UN Special Envoy for Yemen began work in early 2018. Martin Griffiths is a seasoned British diplomat. Griffiths’ planned peace talks for August 2018 in Geneva collapsed. But in December 2018 there was a successful meeting in Sweden at which agreement was reached on de-escalating conflict around the major port of Hudaydah, on opening access to the city of Ta’iz, and on a prisoner exchange. Both the government and the Houthi rebels agreed to pull their forces out of the port.

As our 2018 report noted, Yemen is the worst humanitarian disaster that the UN faces. Getting food and medical supplies into the country is a major UN concern. The port of Hudaydah is by far the major supply centre for Yemen. The protracted fighting for control of the port during 2018 added significantly to the humanitarian disaster. The Panel of Experts goes no further than saying that the GCC coalition hoped that the fighting would push the Houthis to the negotiating table. And perhaps it produced the ceasefire at Hudaydah

A BBC report on 12 May 2019 featured a Houthi pull-out from Hudaydah. However the situation appeared to remain more nuanced. The UN continued to talk about fully implementing the agreements as late as 15 July 2019. Nonetheless this initiative could facilitate the supply of humanitarian aid and that could mean a lot for the people of Yemen. I suspect the loss of full control of the port would be detrimental to the Houthis ability to get supplies. The December 2018 Hudaydah ceasefire seems to be the only movement on the peace front. The best hope is that this small step will lead to others.

The Panel of Experts said that the new US sanctions against Iran have added uncertainty to the Yemen conflict. With respect to Sonal’s and my thoughts on getting everyone around the table, the Panel of Experts noted that Iran has repeatedly said it is willing to play a positive role in the political process and that this is a suggestion rejected by Yemen, the GCC coalition members and the USA.

Although some talks took place between the recognized Hadi government and the UAE, the Panel of Experts reported that the situation in the south of Yemen at the end of 2018 seemed to have further consolidated the power of the Southern Transitional Council as the principal opposition to the recognized government. The UAE leading the ground fighting there has supported allies of the Transitional Council. The various UAE trained militias and local government officials continue to advance “southern political agendas” and secessionist aspirations.

The Panel of Experts’ report shows that there has been an increase in the territories liberated by the Coalition forces culminating in the heavy fighting around the port of Hudaydah at the end of 2018. At the same time the Panel is clear that the recognized Hadi government has not gained control of these liberated territories.

In the North, the Panel reports that the Houthis have consolidated power in and around Sana’a. The Houthis co-opted the General People’s Congress, GPC, associated with the rule of former Yemen President Saleh. On the other hand there were some signs the Houthis had faced challenges. The Panel also reported it had had difficulties accessing the Houthi controlled areas. Also the Houthis have not assisted the humanitarian aid efforts in the areas they control nor the NGOs involved with such efforts.

The Panel noted the continued risk to shipping from missiles and “waterborne improvised explosive devices.” In a disquieting note the Panel reported that it seems the Houthis are assembling their missiles locally – ballistic and cruise missiles – from high value components brought in. But other than a load of assault rifles, no arms shipments were caught. There was an increase in forged counterfeit commercial documents and there are small companies acting to supply Iranian oil that the Houthis can then sell for revenue.

Additional uncertainty for me has been introduced by a New York Times report and an Al Jazeera report of 8 July 2019 that the UAE was reducing troops in Yemen. In the Al Jazeera report the UAE said it was shifting from a war to a peace mode and that it was not worried about a power vacuum because it had trained local militias in southern Yemen. The UAE will presumably continue to pay salaries to the militias that it has trained as the UN Panel of Experts reported that it had done thus far for some of them. The pull back remains new information. I do not know the true import nor the likely consequences.

So where does this leave things in Yemen a year later? The conclusions Sonal and I reached in our Working Paper this time last year about pursuing peace remain valid. The UN should lead peace efforts. They should begin afresh without the constraints called for in earlier UN Security Council resolutions. They should accept the reality of the situation on the ground in Yemen and they should include all the key actors from inside and outside Yemen around the table.

TOP Click:



Yemen a Year Later August 2019 Click square for index I felt obliged to take a look at the situation in Yemen now in mid 2019. I spent a lot of last year struggling to get a handle on the situation in Yemen. And I enjoyed paid employment - well, it was a modest honorarium. I worked with Sonal Marwah of Project Ploughshares to produce a report about the war in Yemen. The text of the joint article was essentially complete by June 2018. Project Ploughshares went on to publish a fine report complete with pictures and maps. It had charts of bombings of civilians and it showed the UN humanitarian program. The War in Yemen: 2011-2018 The Elusive Road to Peace, Working Paper 18-1 appeared dated November 2018. My focus in this update is more limited. It is concerned with updating the country situation and the prospects for peace. Our paper found that the absence of peace in Yemen began when the UN failed to take up its traditional role as the body that builds peace. The UN Security Council simply endorsed a peace process developed by the Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC, in April 2011 to end Yemen’s political crisis from the growing protests there in the Arab Spring. The GCC is a body of Gulf countries with a major role played by Saudi Arabia. That peace process collapsed with a revolt against the tentative new internationally recognized Hadi government in early 2015. We explored the internationalization of the civil war that began in March 2015, when a coalition of GCC members intervened militarily with ground forces, air force attacks and a navel blockade to support the Hadi government. UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions accepted the GCC coalition’s armed intervention. UN Security Council Resolution 2216 called for a return to the GCC plan for peace and also established a UN Panel of Experts to monitor and report on the international arms embargo imposed on the Houthi rebels. We examined the shortcomings of the GCC plan to bring peace to the country. Then the paper showed how the war led to a deteriorating humanitarian situation for Yemeni citizens since 2015. Finally, we looked at prospects for peace as of mid-2018. Our paper concluded that the UN, despite its imperfections, is the main body capable of building a process that might lead to peace in Yemen by satisfying the internal and external players involved in this internationalized civil war. That process would have to face up to the present situation of players on the ground. It would have to be willing to move from some constraints in the earlier UNSC resolution that tied a peace process to the original GCC plan. The main challenge would be to find the political will necessary to do that, to bring all the parties to the table and to hammer out a lasting agreement. Sonal and I placed a premium on UN Security Council documents – reports, resolutions and statements of the President. We found reports by the UN Panel of Experts established under Security Council resolution 2216 particularly useful. The Panel produced a “Final Report” each year at the end of January. Then a Security Council resolution renewed the mandate for another year giving rise to the next Final Report. The Panel offered assessments of the situation in Yemen with a combination of diplomacy and integrity that a body assembled by the UN provides. It was the Panel that at the end of January 2018 reported that Yemen had fragmented. The Houthi rebels controlled the area around the former capital Sana’a in the highlands. Along the Southern coast, a newly formed Southern Transition Council of regional leaders had begun to attract support. They said there was a possibility the south would secede from Yemen. Also in the south the United Arab Emirates, UAE, ground forces had associated with and seemingly supported the Southern Transition Council. The UAE had begun forming and supporting a variety of local militias in the south. The UN Panel of experts felt as 2018 began that a military victory in this war was not a possibility - the war was un-winnable - and that it was difficult to see a single Yemen continuing. The view of our paper was that peace efforts should begin afresh without all the constraints called for in earlier Security Council resolutions, with the reality on the ground in Yemen and with the key actors inside and outside Yemen around the table. So what has changed? My quick-and-easy update as of July 2019 is based on the end of January 2019 Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen plus a little public news reporting. A new UN Special Envoy for Yemen began work in early 2018. Martin Griffiths is a seasoned British diplomat. Griffiths’ planned peace talks for August 2018 in Geneva collapsed. But in December 2018 there was a successful meeting in Sweden at which agreement was reached on de-escalating conflict around the major port of Hudaydah, on opening access to the city of Ta’iz, and on a prisoner exchange. Both the government and the Houthi rebels agreed to pull their forces out of the port. As our 2018 report noted, Yemen is the worst humanitarian disaster that the UN faces. Getting food and medical supplies into the country is a major UN concern. The port of Hudaydah is by far the major supply centre for Yemen. The protracted fighting for control of the port during 2018 added significantly to the humanitarian disaster. The Panel of Experts goes no further than saying that the GCC coalition hoped that the fighting would push the Houthis to the negotiating table. And perhaps it produced the ceasefire at Hudaydah A BBC report on 12 May 2019 featured a Houthi pull-out from Hudaydah. However the situation appeared to remain more nuanced. The UN continued to talk about fully implementing the agreements as late as 15 July 2019. Nonetheless this initiative could facilitate the supply of humanitarian aid and that could mean a lot for the people of Yemen. I suspect the loss of full control of the port would be detrimental to the Houthis ability to get supplies. The December 2018 Hudaydah ceasefire seems to be the only movement on the peace front. The best hope is that this small step will lead to others. The Panel of Experts said that the new US sanctions against Iran have added uncertainty to the Yemen conflict. With respect to Sonal’s and my thoughts on getting everyone around the table, the Panel of Experts noted that Iran has repeatedly said it is willing to play a positive role in the political process and that this is a suggestion rejected by Yemen, the GCC coalition members and the USA. Although some talks took place between the recognized Hadi government and the UAE, the Panel of Experts reported that the situation in the south of Yemen at the end of 2018 seemed to have further consolidated the power of the Southern Transitional Council as the principal opposition to the recognized government. The UAE leading the ground fighting there has supported allies of the Transitional Council. The various UAE trained militias and local government officials continue to advance “southern political agendas” and secessionist aspirations. The Panel of Experts’ report shows that there has been an increase in the territories liberated by the Coalition forces culminating in the heavy fighting around the port of Hudaydah at the end of 2018. At the same time the Panel is clear that the recognized Hadi government has not gained control of these liberated territories. In the North, the Panel reports that the Houthis have consolidated power in and around Sana’a. The Houthis co-opted the General People’s Congress, GPC, associated with the rule of former Yemen President Saleh. On the other hand there were some signs the Houthis had faced challenges. The Panel also reported it had had difficulties accessing the Houthi controlled areas. Also the Houthis have not assisted the humanitarian aid efforts in the areas they control nor the NGOs involved with such efforts. The Panel noted the continued risk to shipping from missiles and “waterborne improvised explosive devices.” In a disquieting note the Panel reported that it seems the Houthis are assembling their missiles locally – ballistic and cruise missiles – from high value components brought in. But other than a load of assault rifles, no arms shipments were caught. There was an increase in forged counterfeit commercial documents and there are small companies acting to supply Iranian oil that the Houthis can then sell for revenue. Additional uncertainty for me has been introduced by a New York Times report and an Al Jazeera report of 8 July 2019 that the UAE was reducing troops in Yemen. In the Al Jazeera report the UAE said it was shifting from a war to a peace mode and that it was not worried about a power vacuum because it had trained local militias in southern Yemen. The UAE will presumably continue to pay salaries to the militias that it has trained as the UN Panel of Experts reported that it had done thus far for some of them. The pull back remains new information. I do not know the true import nor the likely consequences. So where does this leave things in Yemen a year later? The conclusions Sonal and I reached in our Working Paper this time last year about pursuing peace remain valid. The UN should lead peace efforts. They should begin afresh without the constraints called for in earlier UN Security Council resolutions. They should accept the reality of the situation on the ground in Yemen and they should include all the key actors from inside and outside Yemen around the table. TOP Click:
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