Over Christmas 2020 I read Restoring
Democracy in an Age of
Populists and Pestilence, Cormorant
Books, 2020, by Jonathan Manthorpe. The
author has been a journalist for fifty years
serving as overseas bureau chief
and foreign correspondent. He spent time in
the UK and at the EU in Brussels.
He has authored 3 books, notably Claws of
the Panda in 2019.
The book is not intended to provide
any systematic program for
restoring democracy. Rather it examines
underlying problems and it uses its chapters
to examine particular populists and the
particular problems of democracy in the
US, the UK and Europe. Chapters assess
internet attacks and other attacks on
democracy by Russia and China. There is a
chapter on media in democracy and the
growing challenge from social media. A chapter
argues that the power of some
demagogues is fading. Another gives ways of
strengthening Canadian democracy.
The epilogue is a review. Much in this book
will be familiar, but not all of it.
There is useful information and novel
insights.
The book chooses to start in 1989,
with the breakup of the former
Soviet Union, in a chapter called Brave
New World about a takeoff in a
worldwide market under the economic thinking
of Reagan and Thatcher with their
promise of trickle-down economic benefits to
all. It turned out to be scoop-up
economics with a tiny trickle-down resulting
in disillusionment with
globalization.
Letting the Gini Coefficient out
of the Bottle
is a chapter on
the disparity between the few benefitting big
time from the global economy and
the many who have faced 30 years of economic
stagnation and a change in the
nature of work to gig economies. This is a
familiar theme, but here it is well
put. What about the workers? is a
chapter reminding readers that the
first city states sought a sustainable social
order by governing their marketplaces
by rules on weights and measures and on the
value of their currency.
“Regulation and oversight of the marketplace
is as central a responsibility of
government today as it was when urban life
began.” The rise of populism in
North Atlantic countries links to ignoring
this basic truth, says
Manthorpe.
A chapter titled The Clash
between Liberalism and Democracy Lets
Loose the Populists brings new
thinking. Manthorpe takes it from a 2018
book by Fukuyama, Identity: The Demand for
Dignity and the Politics of
Resentment. Most definitions of
democracy include notions of tolerance or
acceptance of diversity. This is an assumption
of liberalism but it can be
questioned in a democracy. Then the notions of
freedom and equality in a
democracy are in conflict and each can carry
mixed meanings. For those in the
Arab Spring uprisings against totalitarian
regimes, freedom meant an ability to
participate in the administration of their
lives. For US conservatives it means
keeping life unfettered by government. Seeking
either optimum equality or
optimum freedom is problematic. Successful
democracy involves balancing
individual freedom and political equality;
balancing a state exercising
legitimate power, and institutions of law and
accountability that seek to
constrain it.
Disaffected voters turn today to
populist or extremist parties that
play on their fears and grievances as they did
in the Nazi era. The first
well-known steps in debasing democracy have
been taken in the US:
gerrymandering constituencies; vilifying
opposition; undermining the rule of
law and undermining the independence of the
judiciary. Leftist and left-liberal
parties have failed to respond to the anxiety
of people discarded or isolated
by economic or cultural change – usually poor
and white. Manthorpe says left/liberal
parties have played to known minorities and
one-issue voters.
There are other factors beyond the
anxiety of people discarded in
economic or cultural change. Among them are
the internet and social media that
have given leaders like Trump direct access to
citizens, avoiding the usual
government or media filters. This creates a
feeling of a more intimate relationship
for supporters, but it undermines the roles of
other important actors in other
parts of a democratic government. Another
factor is unelected bodies that have
come to regulate a wide range of activities.
Banks decide on money supply and
supreme courts decide on constitutional
matters. With these, the significance
of legislatures, elected representatives and
government policies has fallen. On
top of these factors, lobbying has become
problematic everywhere and in
particular in the European Union. The
Stockholm-based International IDEA that
tracks democracies finds drops in voter
turnout for elections widespread.
Considering some particular
situations in chapter 5, God Race and
Country, looks at European populist
leaders Orban (Hungary) and Kaczinski
(Poland). Here economic failure is not at
issue. Both countries have fared well
economically in the EU. Indeed, support for
the EU has grown in both countries
since joining. Here Manthorpe sees the issue
as cultural and nationalistic
discontents arising from the perception that
the social and political agendas
of Brussels are excessively liberal.
Many of their misgivings are common in
the EU. However, I think the
vision of Hungary as a nation based on ethnic
Hungarians everywhere is of concern
beyond the EU.
The EU Council is seen by many as
“without true democratic
credentials and oversight” and yet it creates
rules and regulations. There is a
culture of political correctness involving
sexual orientation, free movement of
peoples, equality, and respect for religions
that makes many uncomfortable. The
current ruling parties draw on those unhappy
sectors. On the other hand, other
Hungarians and Poles are unhappy with their
national leadership. And there have
been forms of gerrymandering. Both countries
have moved somewhat from a rule of
law and independence of the judiciary. This
chapter ends saying part of the
problem is the EU itself and its lack of
clarity around whether it is a trading
agreement or a developing federal state. My
understanding is that part of the
intent of the common market was ongoing
negotiation that would make future
European wars less likely. This meant more
than a simple trading arrangement.
Chapter 6 looks at the UK Brexit
vote and populism. Manthorpe sees
“accidental president” Trump as the product of
a broken political system and a divided
nation. The Brexit referendum arrived from
long-lived factions of the UK
establishment. Margaret Thatcher gave voice to
mainstream English opinion in
1988 when she contrasted the Treaty of Rome
economic union with the concentrating
of power at the centre of a European
conglomerate. The 2016 Brexit referendum
itself came out of a Tory party squabble gone
rogue.
Manthorpe
gives
insights into UK populists Nigel Farage and
Boris Johnson. The former
maintained a lunatic fringe message by means
of a media savvy look and style.
Johnson’s populist brand is similar to that of
Trump: normal
rules of social behaviour don’t apply;
the law is an irritation to be ignored;
winning is everything; lies become
truth if repeated often and vigorously.
Johnson is the product of a well to do
family with a gift of intellect, he is Eton
and Balliol College Oxford
educated.
He worked for The Times newspaper
but
was fired for lying in an article. He moved to
The Daily Telegraph
producing a stream of critical stories
as its EU correspondent in
Bruxelles. He influenced public opinion.
Conrad Black, a dedicated supporter of
Thatcher, ran the Telegraph then and
was supportive. Black later moved
Johnson to editing the Spectator
magazine. That ended with his firing
over an affair with a columnist. He moved into
politics. In 2007 the
Conservatives backed him for Mayor of London.
He was elected. Later he was
elected to parliament. In the politics of the
Brexit referendum vote, Johnson
dithered over which side to take, finally
choosing Brexit when advised it was
likely to win. He campaigned giving misleading
information. The Brexit vote
won.
Cameron resigned as Prime Minister
after the vote for Brexit and was
replaced by May who subsequently held an
election that left her with a
minority. She put several proposals for Brexit
before parliament. All failed.
She resigned May 2019. Johnson was elected PM
and party leader. He attempted to
prorogue parliament but failed. The Labour
Party would not agree to an election
until it was satisfied Johnson could not leave
the EU without a Brexit
agreement. That condition was met for an
election December 2019. Johnson won
convincingly. Then Covid-19 arrived and it
took time for Johnson to learn that
this changed his agenda and that a public
health response was required. This
resulted in pressure on getting a Brexit
agreement by January 2021. (Agreement
was reached.)
The
title of chapter 7 on Trump and
the US mirrors the chapter on Brexit and the
UK. It is a well written analysis
of the US scene up to the 2008-9 crash that
Obama inherited and the unrealized
“change” that Obama had promised but was
unable to bring. Trump was a failed
real estate developer with huge losses in the
1980s and 90s and bankruptcies in
1991 & 1992 before he became a brand and
appeared in the TV reality show The
Apprentice that created an image of him
as a successful businessman. The primaries
in 2015-16, as a result of a change first
introduced by the Democrats, allowed
outsiders to run to be candidate. Otherwise,
Trump, a Republican of convenience
since 2009, could not have succeeded. Even as
his ratings rose Trump was
reviled by Republicans. Only when he had a
chance of beating Clinton did the
Republicans pledge support. By 2017, and
through Trump’s 2020 impeachment,
Republicans were his submissive acolytes.
Trump’s
outrageous remarks ensured a
stream of free advertising by the media in the
2016 campaign and it all
reinforced his supporters. Yet by most normal
electoral systems, Clinton won –
she got the most votes. Only the US system of
electoral votes that allows the
targeting of small numbers of strategically
located voters to turn an election
allowed Trump to win. Even as Trump approached
his inauguration unprecedented
questions were being asked about the
legitimacy of his election as the FBI saw
evidence leading from the Trump campaign to
Russia and Vladimir Putin.
Chapter
8 Orthodoxy, Autocracy,
Nationality looks at the role of
Russian cyber warfare in creating divisions
and confusion in democracies. The 1989
collapse of Russia, and its shrunken
borders preceded President Putin in 1999. By
2004, former satellite countries
were moving into the EU and NATO. In 2008 that
changed when Putin sent Russian
troops into a Georgian conflict involving
pro-Russian enclaves. That was
followed by rebuilding the Russian forces. In
2013 Russia pressured Ukraine’s
President not to join the EU as much of
Ukraine wished. When Ukraine’s
President fled, forces linked to Russia
appeared in Russia-sympathetic areas of
Ukraine and Russia occupied the Crimean
peninsula. Civil war continues.
Causing
confusion in EU countries is
part of Russia’s strategy. Changing an
election is not necessary. Weakening
public confidence in their democratic
institutions is enough. Russian financing
of right-wing groups has gone on since 2010 in
France, UK and in the US. Russia
disrupted the internet in Estonia at one
point. Russian hackers entered the
computer network of the German Parliament in
2015. There was involvement in the
2016 US election campaign to favour Trump.
Trump’s army of digital supporters
was able to drown out news hurtful to Trump
and reinforce news helpful to Trump
– like the WikiLeaks weekly releases during
October 2016. Russian agents even
hacked computers of Clinton supporters. I can
add here that Trump repeatedly claimed
the 2020 election was unfair before the
election. Republican acolytes repeated
that. This is what Manthorpe says Russia would
have done. But he says Russian
cyber agents’ capabilities are formidable but
not insurmountable, and that social
media should be held accountable.
Chapter
9 The Four Basic
Principles the Chinese Dream and the
Covid-19 Nightmare gives a history of
China post 1989 – that is post Tiananmen
Square, when student protests clamoured
for democracy. Retired Chinese leaders
including Deng Xiaoping came out of
retirement and took a stand. They ordered
martial law, ensured the leadership
and armed forces would stand together and then
sent in the army. Large numbers
died. Protests ended. Basic policies were set:
economic reform and openness to
the world would continue; political reform was
too dangerous. They would
address corruption and improve the standards
of living, but China could not
take chaos. So there will be Mao’s Marxist
Leninism; socialism; dictatorship of
the proletariat; and leadership by the CCP.
Political reform has been
suppressed. Economic development without
political reform is not considered
possible in the West, but China continued
industrializing from 1989 to 2020.
Wealth came. It allowed infrastructure. The
people’s army became a modern
volunteer military with the information
technologies of Western military. China
formed a navy which projects power in the
Western Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Xi
Jinping took the leadership in
2012, announced a popular anti-corruption move
and became the most popular
figure since Mao. The team leadership ended.
The 2-year term limit on the
highest office was removed and Xi may remain
until 2027 or beyond. China plays
a more assertive role. UN criticism of the
treatment of the Uighurs is simply
denied. Internally, there is surveillance
everywhere. Internationally, China
has the Belt and Road Initiative, a modern
silk road trading path extending to
Africa and Latin America. Countries could opt
for monies to develop ports or
railways but ended up with Chinese ownership
of such infrastructure. Savvy
neighbours were cautious as China constructed
fortified military outposts on
South China sea islands. China seeks to become
the preeminent power in the
region. It will build on its Belt and Road
Initiative and will maintain
military bases to defend investments. China
will continue trying to undermine
anti-China policies in the US and other
countries via its operatives in media,
academic, business and political communities.
China’s
United Front Work Department works
to co-opt the ethnic Chinese diaspora by
financial incentives and threats or
harassment of family members. Front
organizations for the United Front Work
Department work to undermine support for
Taiwan. The Chinese Student and
Scholar Organization watches Chinese students
at foreign universities.
Confucius Institutes ostensibly spread
appreciation of Chinese culture and
language. All have lures to attract foreign
business people and politicians.
Like Russia, China is capable of hacking
computer networks of groups it
considers a threat. Citizens’ Lab in Toronto
received an email with malware,
but was able to use it to identify the Chinese
operator. The scale of Chinese
activity was little understood until defectors
in 2010 revealed the huge scale
of it in Canada and other countries.
Manthorpe
says the threat from China
for democracies may be diminishing. Target
countries show growing skepticism about
Belt and Road Initiative projects. Protests in
Hong Kong in 2019 revealed the
broad commitment to democracy and dislike of
the CCP.
Then there is Taiwan where the 2016
election
was won by the DPP and China tried to
undermine the DPP government. It spoke of
the one country two systems approach it
negotiated for Hong Kong, while
Taiwanese could see protests in Hong Kong. In
the 2020 elections China promoted
a pro-Beijing candidate. The DPP majority
increased.
Finally, there is the Covid-19 virus
that
originated in Wuhan, and the CCP response.
That revealed a serious problem –
bad news is treated as an affront to the
state. When Dr. Li Wenliang spotted an
outbreak of a new illness in December 2019 and
publicized it, he was detained
and accused of spreading false rumours. The
result was that the virus
spread. A
month later the authorities
could not hide it. However, the infectious
nature was withheld from the World
Health Organization (WHO) for a month. It was
not until March 11 that WHO
declared a pandemic and by then the virus was
established on several
continents.
The
impact was dramatic. Flights
stopped. A large part of industry in China
stopped.
Many countries found out they were
dependent
on things from China. China was the source of
the disease and China provided a
large fraction of needed medical equipment and
drugs. Many countries will
re-assess the goods and services they consider
essential for national security.
On balance, the pressures from the pandemic
will probably cause second thoughts
about unfettered globalization and that should
help democracy. The pandemic has
said something about Trump and Johnson as well
as China. The divisions, denials,
and alternative facts that the populists
promote are a big negative in a
pandemic. Johnson’s UK had to wait a long time
for any action from him to
contain the virus. Trump’s US left most action
to state governors. Manthorpe
takes comfort that China’s inability to
respond as a reliable world partner or
even for the health of its own people means
that it is less to be feared than
was thought: it lacks the flexibility
characteristic of democracies.
Chapter
9 is different. Back to
the Future reminds us of the importance
of the press, first for books then
for investigative journalism, and the
importance of the media in a
democracy.
Manthorpe gives us his
history of media evolution and its impact.
There is a history of publishing and
public defamation. The eighteenth-century
scandal sheets took an evil twist in
revolutionary France. In England reporters
were allowed to witness parliament
and were named the Fourth Estate. This allowed
them to establish independent
journalism – to question and inform on the
branches of government. This model
spread to the US and Europe. Journalists hold
authorities to account daily.
Sometimes they have brought down governments.
This brings challenges. A
formal professional status did not evolve
for journalism but rather a ring of
constraints and regulations topped by laws
of libel and privacy. Press Councils offer the
public a forum for grievances
but they do not offer redress.
The
world was changed again by the
arrival of the internet in 1990. Since then
the anticipated highway for human
interaction was highjacked. Customers of
social media became commodities.
Everything leads towards goods and services.
The few big companies gobble up
any start-up ventures and aim to promote a
psychology of addiction in their
users. Human control of the internet must be
regained because providing
reliable information is important for
democracy. Reuters reports that trust in
media continues to slip downward. Mixing news
with opinion exacerbates
mistrust. Closing local media opened the door
to corruption and trickery and
misinformation at the local level. Also, the
media fail to adequately reflect
the concerns and anxieties of the mainstream
so that the media become identified
with the establishment. To attract audiences,
much of what goes on in some
channels is a mix of propaganda and theatrics.
There
is a problem of paying for
reliable journalism now that the traditional
hard copy model of subscription plus
advertising revenue has been undermined by
free news. Papers in metropolitan
centres are robust enough to survive. There
are beginning signs of a return to
subscriptions for those who care about news.
The young reach out to online
sources. Even without Russian agents. social
media is a problem for reliable
information and for democracy. A
person’s social media contacts tend to be
like-minded. Governments must at some
point insist that social media platforms are
not chat rooms but publishers.
They should be regulated like publishers as
part of the fourth estate. Citizens
deserve reliable information professionally
sorted. The misinformation floating
around on social media about Covid-19 misled
some citizens about its causes and
suggested dangerous “cures”. That caused
deaths.
A
short chapter 11 talks about Trolls,
Bots and Deepfakes. In 2018, newspaper
reports appeared which revealed that
Cambridge Analytica obtained personal data on
Facebook users. The company built
models to exploit what was known about the
users
and
target their inner demons. The company
claimed to influence elections. Academics felt
that improbable. Ted Cruz
dropped the company because it had not
identified supporters well enough. The
company did work for the Trump campaign and
agencies working in support of that
campaign. Yet there is no direct evidence that
it made a significant impact,
and academics seemed to expect little impact.
However, there is academic
thought that the efforts of Russian trolls and
bots to turn political
convictions into anger may have turned the
2016 election in the US.
Humans
respond to drama and humans
tend to believe false information if it makes
them angry or supports what they
believe. Playing on these weaknesses over
time, trolls, Russian operatives
using artificial media accounts, can create
societies that are socially and
politically polarized and misinformed on basic
issues. They use “bots,”
automated scripts, designed to spread
misinformation. Academics have studied the
impacts to estimate risks and the effects on
democratic elections. The impact
of “deepfake” videos can be considerable.
These are videos falsely doctored or
distorted to misrepresent a familiar public
figure’s speech or actions. Under
pressure from regulators in Europe and North
American both Facebook and Twitter
made some changes.
Not
all interference is political.
The work of trolls, bots and deepfake can
create conspiracy theories that
seriously affect health, delay improving
technology like G5, or slow the addressing
of major dangers like climate change. The
real danger of hacking is that there is so
much confusion and disruption that
voters become disenchanted with the whole
democratic process. That can be
addressed by developing skepticism about
anything on the web. and by education.
Good judgment, critical thinking and an
ability to weigh the relative value of
things, all abilities that result from a good
education, help. The Finnish
government runs an anti-disinformation program
to help citizens recognize messages
intended to sow discord among them that could
be coming from Russian trolls.
Manthorpe hopes the internet is given some
parental control!
Chapter
12, Twilight of the
Demagogues, is informative but does not
flow comfortably from previous
chapters. During 2019 millions of people,
animated by a range of issues, took
to the streets in various parts of the world.
In Sudan it was the price of bread;
in Iran – the price of gas; in Chile – the
subway fare; in India – a citizenship
law affecting Muslims; in Hong-Kong – an
extradition law.
Governments had become corrupt
self-perpetuating
aristocracies out of touch with the lives of
quiet desperation being lived by
citizens. Some leaders fell, as in Sudan. So
democracy seems alive! The
most persistent and violent protests in
Europe were by the gilets jaunes in
France where President Macron,
elected on an agenda of major reform, was met
by resistance around fuel price
increases and pension changes. Copy-cat
protests followed around Europe. Real
and perceived losses of standard of living,
and fear of the future, had created
social anxiety across Europe. The danger is
this provides conditions favourable
to fringe parties and populists - a situation
unlikely to improve. And countries
with proportional representation democracy
fared no better than those with
first past the post elections.
Mansthorpe
turns to Macron, France,
the EU, and Macron’s outburst concerning the
EU and its future, in which he
said essentially that the US is pulling out so
the EU has to become more of a
political unit capable of protecting Europe
with its own army. He called for making
the hard decisions. Manthorpe gives an
analysis of the way the EU has avoided
dealing with the trading-block vs political
union dilemma. Also the EU remains
quite un-democratic, for example in the
choosing of the EU Commission
President. While expecting continued “fudging”
Manthorpe notes that a
conference on the future of Europe is
impending and that the departure of the
UK provides some parliamentary space for
developments there. On the other hand
replacing
Merkel will be a problem. Nonetheless,
restoring democracy in Europe will be easier
than in the US. (This was written before the
departure of Trump.)
Manthorpe
agrees with Fukuyama that
rigidity and entrenched actors block political
reform in Europe but that the
dominant role of courts packed with partisan
judges in the US is such as to
frustrate and undermine the work of a
legislature and good government. The
bribery, financing of politics, and gun laws
in the US are also well known problems.
Trump and Johnson did poorly in the Covid-19
pandemic when science was suddenly
necessary and when constant diversion of
public interest became difficult. At
the time of writing, at least Trump will soon
lack his elevated platform from
which to Tweet. What influence remains and the
form it takes is to be seen.
Chapter
13 carries the title Restoring
Democracy. That is misleading because
the chapter is limited to democracy
in Canada. In September 2019 I described a
good book on improving democracy in
Canada. Manthorpe has some distinctive
insights. Both Canada’s former major
partners, the UK and US, will now become more
concerned for themselves in post
Brexit and post Covid times. Canada faces
finding its own circle of
middle-power allies to deal with powers like
China. As a UK colony, Canada
inherited small political and administrative
institutions imported from the UK
that in Canada are linked to a big
confederation of geographically and
culturally diverse regions. This means federal
provincial relations are an
ongoing bureaucratic operation, with the
Supreme Court arbiter of disputes.
This federal provincial arbitration obscures
the roles of the various legislatures.
News
has become a hybrid of
information and entertainment. The party
leader and his/her screen audience determine
the success of a party. A party’s policy and
elected members are less
significant. The Canadian senate is not a
legitimate body to offset the
divergence between the large population
centres and geographic regions as is
the US senate. Manthorpe has conclusions I had
learned from others. For example,
the relationship between party leaders and
others in the party who are elected
has to change to shift power and significance
to the legislatures, those
elected, and the elections.
Manthorpe
concludes with an Epilogue
as of May 2020. Covid-19 put populists into a
contest with scientists whom they
had tended to dismiss. For most, the pandemic
was a reminder of the importance
of an effective, trusted and well-funded
government for times when disaster strikes.
Long-lasting effects include the insight that
unbridled capitalism is harmful
to democracy. Essential workers who make
society function day to day are not
the captains of industry. People doing the
valuable work of keeping health and
security services going and helping citizens
to self-isolate were society’s
most poorly paid – food store workers,
transport drivers, cleaning staff,
agricultural workers. That suggests the
virtues of a Universal Basic Income to
empower the low-paid or unemployed. Such a
system would have automatically
moved to protect the most vulnerable. Then
came the realization that the supply
chains of the globalized economy served local
needs poorly in a pandemic. That
supported calls for domestic production of
basic medical supplies and
pharmaceuticals.
The
assumptions of easy air travel
and the joy of the cruise took blows as air
travel plummeted and cruise ships
became marooned waiting for a country to let
passengers land. People were asked
to follow health guidelines and scientists and
doctors played a visible role.
Trump’s failure to change left the role of
public health promoter for his
challenger, Biden, to adopt. The pandemic
creates a risk for democracy where
some leaders who adopted emergency measures
may be reluctant to abandon them as
the pandemic subsides. Similarly,
the measures
raised concerns about surveillance. Civil
rights groups are concerned, but Manthorpe
maintains democracy is tougher and more
resilient than it appears, even if it
cannot be taken for granted.
Economic
disparities within societies
are a big danger, but Manthorpe goes further.
GDP is a poor measure – the
growth or shrinkage says nothing about the
nature or value of a society. New
Zealand’s Gross National Well-being does a
better job. There follow some
reminders of earlier observations. The book
concludes with a return to a quote
from Fukuyama’s 2018 book, above, for advice
about fixing and sustaining
democracy:
“Successful
democracy
depends not on optimization of the ideals, but
balance: a balance
between individual freedom and political
equality, and between a capable state
exercising legitimate power and the
institutions of law and accountability that
seek to constrain it.”