Thoughts on The Ethical Imagination     March 2008 Click square for index I have sat for over a year trying to put my finger on my concern with the book The Ethical Imagination: Journeys of the Human Spirit (Toronto, House of Anansi Press, 2006)  by Margaret Somerville,  based on her Massey Lectures about ethics and the ethical issues. A McGill University law professor, she also directs a centre there responsible for research and teaching in ethics. Although I found her thoughts on ethics interesting, I had a profound unease about the fundamentals of the ethics venture she described. I think my concern stems from an approach which seems to create a parallel endeavor to more public and more democratically shaped fields like law and human rights. In the book, Somerville seemed dismissive of the role of human rights. For her, the centre of the stage was taken by “shared ethics” and “ethicists.” Fairness and a rule of law are generally considered to be fundamental both at the national level and at the international level. The development of duly constituted UN bodies and the formulation of international human rights law are towering human achievements from the 20th century. The UN rights and UN agencies are universal. They are constituted and mandated by the best universal due process humans have yet come up with – all nation States formally agreeing. Of course, there are problems with international bodies and with international human rights law. It would be unlikely that I, imbued with the views of the world from Canada, would agree with every decision reached and every member appointed. Members must be nominated by nation States and then must secure election from amongst all nominees by the whole body of nation State representatives. Still, at the end of the day, this is international due process and the body consequently speaks with international authority. In contrast, an ethicist need not enjoy nomination and election by even an imperfect representative body of human society. He or she must derive instincts from the communities with which he or she is associated. As I interpret Somerville, the ethicist picks and chooses from the assembled human customs, laws and spiritual wares to produce a “shared ethics”. The ethicist "analyzes facts & uncertainties, sets lines of analysis with relevant norms and prioritizes norms." Then the ethicist points to problems. In my view, ethical reflection must fit within the wider human processes leading to adjustments to the laws or human rights by forms of due process. In the wider society or world community, it is the duly constituted or appointed court or body, which does precisely the things Somerville lists for the tasks of the ethicist but in order to reach a due process decision. In some cases the decision may be the enforceable ruling of a judge. In other cases, it will be an authoritative pronouncement to guide member nation States of the UN. Laws and international human rights are the result of a lot of democratic debate. The related national and international politics are as messy as we are human. Nonetheless, the output of courts, international agencies and human rights systems enjoys a legitimacy of due process which a well intentioned ethicist with self selected community connections can hardly claim. It is therefore not convincing to imply that ethics should be taken as seriously as positions developed by international agencies or by international human rights law through international due process. To give just one example of what worries me in the book, the book casually favours its own view on genetics and ethics, lightly dismissing the positions taken by UNESCO’s declarations on genetics and ethics. UNESCO is not without problems, but UNESCO offers the most legitimate international advice available within its mandated areas. If a Canadian ethicist or Canada disagrees with UNESCO, that is understandable. Nonetheless I would not want Canadian courts to lightly set aside UNESCO’s internationally legitimized advice in favour of ethical advice developed by a Canadian academic unit. Elsewhere, Somerville boldly suggests that ethics are to safeguard individual rights and liberties but to protect community; encompassing justice and redress for wrongs, but also compassion, mercy forgiveness and love based on norms acceptable to individuals but shared across time and place (p42). That worries me too. We have Canadian Charter rights in Canada. Canadians and people in most countries at the UN have rights promised under the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Most rights can be limited according to fundamental principles of justice in Canada and according to principles which protect the rights and freedoms of others under the CCPR. The courts in Canada and the Human Rights Committee at the UN can interpret the rights and offer justice and promote forms of redress. Sentencing in Canada takes into account the particular circumstances of the case and can reflect compassion and mercy. The Human Rights Committee can only give authoritative guidance, but Canadian court decisions are enforceable in real time. The book gives the impression that ethics and ethicists are somehow an alternative parallel system to the wider rule of law and due process and that ethics somehow safeguards individual rights and liberties. If “ethics” is to do these things, the book should show how. In my view ethics and ethicists could most usefully contribute to developing and reinforcing the wider rule of law through its due processes. In summary, the ideas in The Ethical Imagination were interesting and sources of insights broad. My big concern is that information was missing about how the work of academic ethicists, with their shared values and procedures, informs and reinforces the wider human endeavour producing national laws, international human rights law and international principles and guidelines. TOP   Click:

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