I
discovered
the book “The End of
Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a
War Without End,” by Peter
Galbraith
(Simon & Schuster 2006) by chance but
found it helpfully
informative.
Some
chapters
brim with meaty
political analysis. One of them is chapter 1
which introduces the theme
that
there is a major civil war in Iraq
and introduces the major political groups
involved. The book will not
explore
events leading up to the US
invasion of Iraq
in
2003,
but will explore subsequent events with a
purpose: “My purpose is to
urge a
course of action by which the US
can extricate itself from the mess in Iraq,
including from the
escalating
civil war.” The intended final chapter, 11
“How to Get Out of Iraq”
fulfils
that purpose rather well.
In
the
chapters between 1 and 11,
the author draws on personal experience to
provide background
information to
support the “How to Get Out …” and to
develop the thesis that Iraq has
never been a stable single
nation
State, but rather a gathering of three major
regional units plus Baghdad:
Khurdish North,
Shiite Arab South and Sunni Arab. The
“Afterword,” written January 2007
reinforces the author’s “How to Get Out …”
Nonetheless, the book does
contain
an analysis showing how beginning the war
was foolish at that time,
counterproductive and without justification
in terms of stated
objectives and
US foreign policy interests. The alleged
weapons of mass destruction
and
support of terrorism don’t withstand this
scrutiny. And, as the author
says,
promoting democracy in the Middle East
is
hardly a basis for declaring war.
Experience
from
the ground is
helpful throughout. For several years the
author was associated with
the US
government. As staff member for the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee,
the
author met Iraqi officials in 1984 during
the early part of the war
initiated
by Iraq
with Iran.
The
policy shifts of the US
during this war are reported. In 1988, after
the armistice, the author
was part
of a fact finding group to meet refugees in
eastern Turkey
to support a call by Senator Pell for
sanctions against Iraq
for mass
killings in Kurdish villages. His personal
presence during the Kurdish
part of
the Kurdish and Shiite uprisings in March
1991 allows insight into the
impact
of the fact that George Bush senior appeared
to encourage the uprisings
but
failed to support them. Immediately after
the US
army entered Bahgdad in 2003, the
author was there as an adviser for an ABC
News team. This experience
adds
colour to chapter 6’s documentation of the
US army’s failure to prevent
the
theft: of dangerous biological materials –
black fever, cholera; of
yellowcake
or unprocessed uranium; of forty truck loads
worth of conventional
explosives
relevant to nuclear weapons production; and,
of high precision nuclear
program
machinery. There is also an account of the
ABC News team finding
documents. The
failure to protect the Iraq National Museum’s
priceless
ancient artifacts is staggering. This and
the failure to
protect the
Iraq National Library’s documentary records
were contrary to
international law.
The
chapters
leading through the several US
administrators during the US
administration of Iraq
recall for us the major shifts and
differences in approach and of the
underlying lack of connection of
administrators
with the Iraq
reality. I found the author’s description of
the constitutional process
full of
useful insights and helpful in reinforcing
the author’s “How to Get Out
….” I sensed
some respect from the author for the work of
US Ambassador Khalilzad in
facilitating that constitution process
despite the sense conveyed of a
partisan
divide.
The
conclusion to chapter 11 “How
to Get Out ..”, the
intended initial end to the book, is
moving as well as powerful. It is worth
quoting:
“Iraq’s
civil
war
is the messy end of a country that never
worked as a voluntary
union and that
brought misery to most of its people most of
the time. By invading Iraq, the US
precipitated Iraq’s
collapse
… but did not cause it. Partition – the
Iraqi solution – has
produced
stability in most of the country and for
this reason should be
accepted. In
Bahgdad, and in other mixed Sunni-Shiite
areas, the US
cannot contribute to the solution
because there is no solution, at least in
the foreseeable future. It is
a
tragedy, and it is unsatisfying to admit …
But it is so. No purpose is
served
by a prolonged US American presence anywhere
in Arab Iraq. The war’s
architects
believed they could change the Middle East.
And so they did.”
Yes I
had a few
concerns about
the book but they are minor. Along the way I
found some unacknowledged
little
repeats irritating. The implicit value of
the chapters showing the
history of US
policy since the Iraq Iran war, the role of
Kurds or the arrogance and ignorance of the
US
post-war occupation in developing
the purpose could all have been made a bit
more explicit for my taste.
Sometimes I found the time jumps to a
chapter and within some later
chapters a
bit bothersome. Maybe that would have been
helped by a more ruthless
explicit
introduction to the role for the chapter.
My
more
serious comment is best
viewed as a request for another book rather
than a criticism of this
one. This
book is by a US
citizen
writing for a US
readership
and especially for Washington
with a
stated
purpose of how to get the US
out of Iraq.
There was little reference to other
countries involved and their roles.
There
was a reference to the British Ambassador
being involved in the removal
of one US
administrator of Iraq.
Yet I had to remind myself
after the book that other nation States were
involved in this invasion
and
administration of Iraq and that they too
will need to find a “how to
get out”
arrangement too. I would have welcomed more
about the roles and
understandings
between the US,
the UK
and other
more modest armed force contributions –
whether like the Spanish, which
have
got out, or whether like the Australians,
which are still involved.
Interestingly, as I write these thoughts in
August 2007, the
British are in the
process of pulling out of the South of Iraq
and, as they report it,
“handing
over to the Iraqi government.”
In his
acknowledgments at the end
of his book, Peter Galbraith gives his
illustrious father, John
Kenneth, the
last word - general and principled. I can do
no less:
“The economic and
social problems
described [in The Economics of
Innocent
Fraud], as also mass poverty and
starvation can, with thought and
action,
be addressed. So they have already been. War
remains the decisive human
failure.”
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